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INTRODUCTION

When Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act1
("ADA") on July 26, 1990, supporters heralded the Act as a full-scale
victory for the 43 million disabled Americans.2 The Act's protections
went far beyond those of its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of
1974,3 which only prohibited discrimination against individuals with
1 . 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101 -12213 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 1 21 01 (a)(1) (estimating that 43 million Americans are disabled);

2 See

ADA: the Advocates; Comments from Legislators and A dvocates Attending the Signing of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 3 WORKLIFE 12 (Sept. 22, 1 990).

3. 29 u.s.c. §§ 701 -797(b) (1994).
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disabilities by entities receiving federal funding.4 The new act was
intended to prevent discrimination by private and public employers,
public services, and public accommodations.5 In a bill signing cere
mony at the White House, in front· of more than two thousand advo
cates for the disabled, then President George Bush likened the ADA
to the signing of the Declaration of Independence and the dismantling
of the Berlin Wall.6 Amidst mighty cheers from the crowd, President
Bush proclaimed that, because of the new law, "every man, woman
and child with a disability can now pass through once-closed doors
into a bright new era of equality, independence, and freedom."7
Sandra Swift Parrino, director of the National Council on Disability,
stated assuredly that the ADA was "a new beginning . . . [that would]
shape the lives of those with disabilities for decades to come. "8
Disability advocates' optimism about the broad reach of the ADA
was certainly justified, for Congress also had grand goals in mind when
enacting the law. The statute states that the main purposes of the
ADA are to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities"
and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities . . . . "9
The legislative history also indicates that Congress intended the ADA
to be far-reaching in scope and dramatic in impact. Both the Senate
arid House Reports state that the purpose of the ADA is to "end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American
life . . . ."10
4. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States . .. shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participa
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance .... ").
5. Title I of the Act applies to employers. Title II applies to public services. Title III
applies to public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (1994).
6. See John W. Mashek, To Cheers, Bush Signs Rights Law for Disabled, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 27, 1990, at 4 (National/Foreign); A Law for Every American, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 1990, at A26.
7. Ann Devroy, Jn Emotion-Filled Ceremony, Bush Signs Rights Law for America's
Disabled, WASH. POST, July 27' 1990, at Al8.
8. Id.
9. 42 u.s.c. § 12101(b) (1994).
10. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 2 (1989). The
Senate report came from the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. The House of
Representatives' reports came from the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Education and Labor. There are widely divergent views about the value of committee re
ports in shedding light on congressional intent. The main objection to the use of committee
reports is that they reflect only the views of the committee; not Congress as a whole. Others,
however, view committee reports as the "most useful legislative history." WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 302-03 (2000) [herein
after ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION] . In fact, nearly half of all Supreme Court references to leg-
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Despite its initial glamour and fanfare, the ADA has proven to be
only a modest protector of the disabled. 1 1 One study found that
disabled plaintiffs lose in more than ninety-three percent of reported
ADA employment cases decided on the merits at the trial court
level. 12 Their chances of success at the appellate level are similarly
unlikely .13 In addition, on at least four occasions in recent years, courts
have significantly limited the potential reach of the ADA. In a series
of three cases
Sutton v. United A irlines, Inc.,14 Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, lnc. , 15 and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg16
the
Supreme Court held that an individual who uses a corrective device or
medication to mitigate the effects of his disability does not qualify as
"disabled" under the statute.17 As a result, the Court limited the class
-

-

islative history are to committee reports. The committee reports prove useful in providing an
overview of legislation and offer additional information about how specific provisions fit
within the statutory scheme. In addition, empirical studies suggest that the reports often
express the views of the chamber as a whole, rather than just the committee. ld. A full
debate about the value of legislative history is beyond the scope of this Note. The author has
assumed that committee reports reflect the view of the entire congressional chamber.
11. Jennifer S. Geetter, The Condition Dilemma: A New Approach to Insurance
Coverage of Disabilities, 37 HARV. J. ON LEOIS. 521, 525 (2000).
12. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities A ct: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C. R. -C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (hereinafter Colker, Windfall]. In a study of civil
rights actions between 1978 and 1985, Theodore Eisenberg found that plaintiff success rates
varied from a high of 53% in voting rights cases to a low of 14% in prisoner rights cases.
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner
Cases, 77 GEO. L. J. 1567, 1578 (1989). Only prisoner rights cases face as difficult odds as
ADA cases. Id.
13. Defendants prevail in 84% of cases appealed by plaintiffs. Colker, Windfall, supra
note 12, at 108. This Note recognizes that these statistics alone do not indicate that the ADA
has failed to protect the disabled. In conjunction with other evidence, however, they are
powerful indications.
14. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Sutton involved two commercial airline pilots denied employ
ment because of severely myopic vision. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471. The plaintiffs' ADA claims
were dismissed because the pilots wore glasses that fully corrected their vision and therefore,
they were not disabled under the law. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. Id.
15. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
16. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
17. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the
ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 321 (2000). The statute defines a
"disability " as a "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities . . . ; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment. " 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). A physical or mental impairment
includes any physiological disorder, condition, or anatomical loss that affects a major bodily
system or a mental or psychological disorder. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989). An individ
ual has a record of impairment if he or she has a history of or has been misclassified as hav
ing a disability. 29 C. F.R. § 1630.2 (2000). An individual is regarded as having such impair
ment if he or she is treated as having a disability, regardless of whether he or she is actually
disabled under section (A). Id. A major life activity is defined as "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work
ing. " Id. The House Report specifies that the definition of disability does not include physi
cal or mental characteristics, such as hair color or eye color, that are not the result of a men
tal or physiological disorder. H. R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990). In addition, it does
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of potential plaintiffs who could sue under the ADA. Similarly, in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,18 the Court limited the
definition of "disability" by ruling that the plaintiff, a factory worker
suffering fr om carpal tunnel syndrome, was not disabled under the
statute because her illness only affected her ability to work, not her
ability to perform "activities that are of central importance to most
people's daily lives."19 The unanimous court reasoned that "disability"
should not be assessed by looking only at the plaintiff's ability to per
form her job; rather, the plaintiff must present additional evidence of
hardship outside of the work setting.20 The Court's opinion increases
the burden that plaintiffs bear in proving they are disabled. In
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,21 the Court broadened an em
ployer's ability to defend against an employee's charge of disability
discrimination.22 It held that an employer may refuse to hire a disabled
individual if the employee's job presents a threat to the employee's
own health or safety because of his disability.23 Prior to this holding, an
employer was only permitted to deny employment if the employee's
disability presented a threat to the health or safety of others.24 Finally,
in Board of Trustees v. Garrett,25 the Court held that, pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment,26 suits under Title I of the ADA cannot be
brought against a State to recover for monetary damages.27
not include environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages, such as poverty or a prison
record. Id.
18. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
19. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 185.
20. Id. at 198.
21. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
22. See Chevron 536 U.S. at 87.
23. See id.

24. See id. at 2049. This defense, known as the "direct threat" defense, is found in
§ 102 of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The Court broadened the defense because it
believed that Congress's decision to mention only threats to others in the statute itself did
not indicate that Congress intended to exclude threats to self. See id.
25. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Two disabled state employees brought this discrimination suit
against the State of Alabama. Both requested and were denied accommodations in their
employment.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
27. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). For a discussion of Title I, see
infra note 29. Self-insured employers may also be immunized from state anti-discrimination
laws under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974. 29 U.S.C. §
1001-1461 (1988). Section 514(a) of ERISA precludes states from regulating health benefits
provided by self-insured employers. See generally, BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW 418-38 (2000). As a consequence, ERISA preempts discrimination claims related to
employee benefits brought in state court against self-insured employers. See Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732-33 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 91
(1983). Specifically, § 514(a) states that ERISA "supersedes" any state law that
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The cases discussed above illustrate four ways in which the
Supreme Court has limited the reach of the ADA in protecting the
disabled and, in doing so, undermined the purposes of the law. This
Note addresses another example. It discusses how courts have broadly
interpreted Section 501(c) of the ADA28 - the safe harbor provision
- such that health and disability insurers and self-insured employers
are nearly fully exempt from Titles 129 and III30 of the ADA. In
"relates to" an employee benefit plan. Section 514(b)(2)(A) "saves " from preemption any
state laws that regulate banking, investment, or insurance. Section 514(b)(2)(B) states that
self-insured employee benefit plans do not qualify as insurance plans, thus preventing them
from being "saved" from preemption. See FURROW, supra note 27, at 419. In addition,
liability in federal court for discrimination under § 510 of ERISA is limited to instances in
which a plaintiff can prove a specific intent to evade ERISA - an exceedingly difficult stan
dard.See John E. Estes, Employee Benefits or Employer "Subterfuge": The Americans with
Disabilities Act's Prohibition Against Discriminatory Health Plans, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 85, 85 (1994).Two cases illustrate how ERISA can leave disabled individuals without a
remedy for disability-based discrimination. In McGann v. fl & H Music Co. , pursuant to
§ 510, the Fifth Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of a self-insured employer when
the employer lowered benefits for HIV/AID S care from $1,000,000 to $5,000 after the plain
tiff was diagnosed with AIDS. McGann, 946 F.2d 401, 403 (1991). The court reasoned that
§ 510 permitted the employer to alter the terms of its benefits plan. See id. at 408.In Owens
v. Storehouse, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a lower court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant employer who capped benefits associated with HIV/AID S care
because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of intentional discrimination. Owens, 984
F.2d 394, 399 (11th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the immunity from state discrimination laws
afforded by ERISA creates an even greater need fo r adequate protections under the ADA.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1220l(c) (1994).
29. Title I calls for an end to discrimination against the disabled in all aspects of em
ployment.It states that, "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application pro
cedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(1994). Included among the prohibitions of Title I is discrimination with regard to fringe
benefits, which include health and disability insurance. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994);
H.R. REP. No.101-485, pt.3, at 36 (1990); s. REP. No.101-116, at 28-29 (1989); 29 C.F.R.§
1630.4 (2000); 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.5 (2000) ("In addition, it should also be noted that this
part is intended to require that employees with disabilities be accorded equal access to
whatever health insurance coverage the employer provides to other employees.").The pro
hibition against discrimination applies not only to employers but also to those entities with
which employers contract to administer or provide fringe benefits. Carparts Distrib. Ctr.Inc.
v. Auto. Wholesaler's Assoc., 37 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a benefits
administrator is a covered entity under Title I); see 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.4 (2000). These entities
include insurers, third party administrators, health maintenance organizations, and stop-loss
carriers.
30. Title III prohibits discrimination against the disabled "in the full and equal enjoy
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation" that is privately operated.See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 {1994); S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 59. Public establishments operated by the federal, state, or local gov
ernments are covered under Title II of the ADA. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994).
Congress includes insurance offices on the list of entities considered public accommodations.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7){ F) (1994). In addition, the legislative history indicates that Con
gress did not intend this list to be all-inclusive. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 59. (" For exam
ple, the legislation lists 'golf course' as an example under the category of 'place of exercise or
recreation.' This does not mean that only driving ranges constitute 'other similar establish
ments. ' Tennis courts, basketball courts, dance halls, playgrounds, and aerobic facilities ...
are also included ....' ').
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§ 501(c),31 Congress qualified the reach of the statute as it applies to
health and disability insurers and self-insured employers by offering
these entities a partial exemption from the statute. The provision
states:
Titles I through IV of the Act shall not be construed to prohibit or re
strict -

(1) an insurer, hospital, or medical service company,

health maintenance

organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or

similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with
State law; or

(2) a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, spon

soring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit

plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or admin
istering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, spon
soring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit
plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of subchapter I and II of this Chapter.32

A threshold issue must be addressed prior to further discussion of
the safe harbor. The federal circuits are split as to whether Title III
requires insurers to offer the disabled equal access to the goods and
services of public accommodations
in this case, insurance policies
- or merely physical entry to their buildings.33 This Note assumes that
-

31. 42 U. S.C. § 12201(c).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). Section 501(c)(l) applies to any organization, most typically a
health insurer or health maintenance organization, that provides health or disability insur
ance benefits directly to individuals or to employee groups. Section 501(c)(2) will most typi
cally apply to an employer who contracts with another entity to provide insurance benefits to
its employees. Section 501(c)(3) applies to self-insured employers and was included to
ensure that these employers are still subject to the preemption provision of ERISA. See
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70-71 (1990).
33. The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the statute only regulates the
disabled's physical access to insurance offices, not their enjoyment of insurance policies. See
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1998); Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky.,
Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "a bookstore . . . must make its facilities
and sales operations accessible to individuals with disabilities, but is not required to stock
Brailled or large print books. Similarly, a video store must make its facilities and rental op
erations accessible, but is not required to stock closed caption video tapes."); Parker v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1997). The First and Seventh Circuits
have held that Title III mandates that the disabled have equal access to insurance policies.
See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Carparts Distrib.
Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Assoc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Prohibited discrimination
under Title Ill includes the denial, on the basis of disability, of the opportunity to benefit
from the goods, services, privileges, advantages or accommodations of an entity."). Despite
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Congress intended that the statute be applied more broadly to include
equal access to goods and services. If Title III only required insurers to
provide physical entry to insurance offices, insurers would be permit
ted to discriminate against the disabled in the provision of insurance
policies without violating the ADA, and any further discussion of the
safe harbor would be pointless. A number of arguments support this
Note's assumption. First, the statute itself calls for the equal enjoy
ment of the goods and services of public accommodations.34 Second,
the existence of the safe harbor suggests that Title III applies to the
sale of insurance policies; otherwise, the safe harbor would. be
superfluous. Third, among the list of public accommodations,
Congress included entities, such as a travel service, that primarily offer
their services by phone or mail. If Title III were to apply to these
entities in any meaningful way, it would need to require more than just
physical entry for the disabled.35
Assuming that Title III requires insurers to provide equal access to
insurance policies permits further inquiry into the intent of the safe
harbor provision. Congress carved out the safe harbor exemption to
allow insurers to continue to underwrite risks.36 Underwriting is the
process by which an insurer assesses an individual policyholder's
likelihood of requiring benefits or filing claims to determine the indi
vidual's premium payment.37 The impracticality of determining indi
vidually-rated premiums leads insurers to group individuals by
lifestyle, behaviors, or health status and then set premiums for each
these holdings, no circuit has gone so far as to hold explicitly that Title III regulates the
content of insurance policies offered to the disabled. For a detailed discussion of this debate,
see generally Mary Carol Joly, Doe and Smith v.Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company: The
Possible Impact on HIV-Infected Individuals, 4 DEPAUL J.HEALTH CARE L. 193 {2000), and
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Insurance and the ADA, 46 DE PAUL L. REV. 915, 940-45
(1997).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182{a) (1994) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation ....").
35. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 ("[I)t would be irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase
the same services over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended
such an absurd result.").
36. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84-85 {1989) ("[T)he Committee added section 501(c) to
make it clear that this legislation will not disrupt the current nature of insurance underwrit
ing or the current regulatory structure for self-insured employers or of the insurance indus
try in sales, underwriting, pricing, administrative and other services, claims, and similar in
surance related activities . . .. ) Insurance allows risk averse individuals to pay someone else
to assum� risks for them. Insurers are able to assume these risks by grouping individuals
together so they may use premiums from one policyholder to cover the costs of benefits paid
to other policyholders.As a result, policyholders who do not incur losses over the coverage
period subsidize the payment of benefits to those who do incur losses. See ROBERT H.
JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 11-17 {2d ed.1996).
"

.

37. See JERRY, supra note 36 at 17.
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group.38 This process permits insurers to guarantee their ability to pay
benefits later and limits the need for cross-subsidization across policy
holders.39 It also results in higher premium payments for disabled and
sick individuals who the insurer predicts will require more benefits.
Congress created an exemption from the ADA for insurers because it
feared that attempts by insurers to underwrite the policies of disabled
individuals would violate the statute.4° Congress was concerned that if
insurers were no longer able to underwrite, the ADA would destroy
the profitability of the insurance industry.
Although Congress intended the safe harbor provision to offer
insurers an exemption from the ADA, its ambiguous language raises
questions as to the extent of the exemption.41 Congress placed two
limitations on this exemption. First, disability-based discrimination is
only exempt if insurers and employers are "underwriting risks, classi
fying risks, or administering such risks."42 Second, discrimination is not
exempt if the insurer has engaged in "subterfuge to evade the pur
poses of Titles I and III."43 Congress failed, however, to explain these
two limiting clauses.44 These ambiguous clauses have prompted a
debate between disability rights advocates, who view the exemption as
limited, and insurers, who view it as wide-reaching.45
38. See id. at 14.
39. See id.
40. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 86 ("[Without the safe harbor,] this legislation could
arguably find violative of its provisions any action taken by an insurer or employer which
treats disabled persons differently under an insurance or benefit plan because they represent
an increased hazard of death or illness.").
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
43. Id. Congress's failure to define the term "subterfuge" and the resulting ambiguity
surrounding the term's meaning is primarily responsible for the controversy surrounding the
scope of the safe harbor provision. The meaning of the term as defined by the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission, the agency responsible for enforcing the ADA, and
by the courts will be discussed infra notes 61-62, 93-105 and accompanying text.
44. Voicing his dissent to the House Judiciary Report on the ADA, Representative
Chuck Douglas recognized some of the unanswered questions raised by the text's use of the
term subterfuge:

There are also sections of the bill which either have not been explained carefully or are not
capable of being understood.A good example comes in Section 501(c) which deals with in
surance.After spending a great deal of time explaining what insurance plans are permissible,
the Act seems to say that these same plans which were previously approved are not permis
sible if they act as a subterfuge to the purposes of the Act. What does that mean? How does
an employer or employee know when a subterfuge has been created?
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 94 (1990).
45. See Jeffrey S. Manning, A re Insurance Companies Liable Under the Americans with
Disabilities A ct, 88 CAL. L. REV. 6f17, 637 (2000) ("This provision has provoked a debate
about what restrictions on the ADA' s applicability to insurance its drafters intended. Did
the drafters mean to exempt insurers altogether, or only to exempt 'underwriting risks' if
consistent with state law?"). Manning argued that the safe harbor should permit insurers to
make disability-based distinctions in the provision of insurance only if they can justify those
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This Note argues that Congress intended the safe harbor provision
to offer insurers and self-insured employers a narrow exemption from
the ADA and suggests a standard for courts to use in determining
whether the exemption applies. Part I demonstrates that the language
of the statute, its legislative history, and agency interpretations, as well
as other health care safe harbors, support a limited interpretation of
the reach of the safe harbor provision. Part II illustrates that, despite
Congress's intent, courts have interpreted the provision broadly, such
that insurers and employers are nearly immunized from the require
ments of the ADA. Part III proposes a novel remedy to the disparity
between Congress's intent and courts' interpretations of the safe
harbor. It proposes that courts adopt the undue hardship evidentiary
standard used to determine whether an employer must offer an em
ployee a reasonable accommodation under Title I in safe harbor de
fense cases.46 By requiring defendant insurers to provide evidence jus
tifying disability-based distinctions, the undue hardship standard will
assure that insurers remain bound by the ADA and faithful to
congressional intent.
I.

INTERPRETING THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION

This Part examines the safe harbor statutory language, legislative
history, agency interpretations, and other health care statutes and safe
harbors to discuss the scope of the ADA's safe harbor provision. It
concludes that although Congress intended the safe harbor to allow
insurers and employers to continue underwriting and risk classifying, it
designed the provision to offer only a limited exception to the ADA,
not a full-scale exemption from the AD A's requirements.
A.

Statutory Language and Legislative History

The ambiguity of the safe harbor statutory language raises many
questions about the reach and limitations of insurers' exemption
from the ADA,47 but provides incomplete answers. By including the
subterfuge clause, Congress indicated that it intended the exemption
distinctions with statistical data. See id. at 643-47. Manning's comment, however, failed to
explain how courts should implement his proposed solution. See also Craig C. Dirrim, Note,
Unpopular but Not Unfair: The Fifth Circuit Considers the Terms but Ignores the Endearment
in McGann v. H & H Music Co., 72 NEB. L. REV . 860, 879"84 (1993) (discussing the diverg
ing viewpoints of advocates about the reach· of the safe harbor provision).
46. The ADA requires covered entities to make reasonable accommodations for all in
dividuals with disabilities "unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommoda
tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(S)(A). The statute defines an "undue hardship" as "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense," when considered in light of several other factors.
42 u.s.c. § 12111(10).
47. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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to be somewhat limited.48 That is, Congress did not intend the safe
harbor to be a trump card or an "escape hatch" to permit insurers and
employers to engage in discrimination.49 In addition, the reach of the
subterfuge clause itself must be limited. If all disability-based distinc
tions were regarded as subterfuge, any disability-based distinction
made by an insurer would violate the ADA.50 An all-encompassing
definition of subterfuge is, therefore, inappropriate because it treats
the words of the safe harbor as surplusage.51
The legislative history provides further guidance about the
purposes and reach of the safe harbor provision.52 The Senate Report
indicates that Congress included the provision to ensure that the ADA
would not disrupt the insurance industry or the regulatory structure
for self-insured employers.53 Congress was concerned that the ADA
48. See 42 U. S.C. § 12201(c) (1994) ("Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of Title I and III of this chapter.").
·

49. Stephen T. Kaminski, Must Employers Pay for Viagra? An Americans with
Disabilities Act Analysis Post-Bragdon and Sutton, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 73, 121
(2000).
50. See H. Miriam Farber, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in
Employer-Provided Health Care Plans Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 912 (1994) ("[T)he subti;:rfuge language should not be read to create
such an imposing burden that in effect would swallow up the limiting construction that sec
tion 501(c) was intended to ensure.").
51. The statutory interpretation rule against surplusage is the "presumption that every
statutory term adds something to the law's regulatory impact." See ESKRIDGE,
LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 266. But see Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age
of Textualism: A Practitioner's Guide to Arguing Cases ofStatutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON
L. REV. 451 (2002) (agreeing with Karl Llewellyn's argument that if "[a word or clause] is
inadvertently inserted or repugnant to the rest of the statute, [the word or clause] may be
rejected as surplusage" (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
395, 401-06 (1950))).
52. Courts and scholars disagree about the importance and relevance of legislative
history as a tool for statutory interpretation. See generally, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 207-38 (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE,
INTERPRETATION] (discussing courts' use of legislative history in the twentieth century). The
Supreme Court first relied on legislative history in interpreting a federal immigration statute
in Church ofthe Holy Trinity v. United States. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).It stated "that a thing may
be within the letter of the statute yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intentions of its makers." 143 U.S. at 459. Since Holy Trinity, the Court has often
used legislative history to assist in statutory interpretation.See, e.g. , Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 with the assistance of
legislative history); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (same); Duplet
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (interpreting the Clayton Act by relying
on legislative deliberations). More recently, proponents of the new textualist movement
have argued against using legislative history as a tool in statutory interpretation. See e.g.,
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-28 (1993); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) ( Scalia, J., concurring); ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 52, at 402 n.97.
Courts have not, however, rejected legislative history as an important tool. See Wisconsin
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991); ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION,
supra at 403 n.102.
53. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84-85 (1989). Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett argue that
committee reports are the most reliable and useful source of legislative history. See

850

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:840

would interfere with efforts by insurers to classify risks.54 Although
Congress intended to protect the solvency of the insurance industry,
neither the statutory text nor the legislative history explicitly states the
extent of the desired protection. There is no indication in the Senate
Report that Congress intended to permit insurers to continue business
as usual, particularly if such business included discrimination against
the disabled. Such an interpretation conflicts with the otherwise wide
reaching goals of the statute.55
More specifically, the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended the safe harbor to have limited reach. Both the Senate and
House Reports state that the reach of the safe harbor is limited by in
surers' and employers' abilities to offer actuarial evidence or "actual
or reasonably anticipated experience" that justifies their decisions to
make a disability-based distinction.56 Presumably, Congress intended
courts to evaluate this kind of evidence when making decisions in safe
harbor cases. Similarly, a limited exemption is consistent with the
overall wide-reaching purpose of the ADA as described in the Senate
and House reports.57
The safe harbor language and legislative history support a broad
enough interpretation of the provision to permit insurers and employ
ers to continue to underwrite and make risk classifications. The legis
lative history limits the provision's reach, however, by requiring that
insurers justify disability-based distinctions with data or actuarial ex
perience.58 The legislative history, like the statutory language, raises
questions about the extent of these limits. For instance, the legislative
history does not state the kind or amount of actuarial evidence suffi
cient or necessary to trigger safe harbor protection.
ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 303 ("For now, it seems safe to say that commit
tee reports have weathered the most cynical critiques of judicial reliance and that careful use
of them in interpretation is justified.").
54. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 86.
55. The Senate Report states:
The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into
the economic and social mainstream of American life, to provide enforceable standards ad
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and to ensure that the Federal
government plays a central role in enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals with
disabilities.
s. REP. No. 101-116, at 2.
56. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 85 (reporting that a plan may not refuse or limit insurance
based on a physical or mental impairment, "except where the refusal, limitation, or rate dif
ferential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably antici
pated experience."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 71 (1990) (reporting that the "ADA
requires that underwriting and classification of risks be based on sound actuarial principles
or be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience").
57. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23.
58. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 85; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 71.
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Agency Interpretations

The interpretations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), the federal agency charged with interpreting
and enforcing the ADA,59 provide additional evidence that the safe
harbor offers a narrow exception for insurers and employers. The
agency offered its interpretation of the safe harbor in the ADA's im
plementing regulations60 as well as the agency's Interim Enforcement

Guidance.61
By requiring that insurers justify disability-based distinctions with
actuarial data, the EEOC limits the reach of the safe harbor exemp
tion. 62 The EEOC incorporates an actuarial cost standard by creating a
framework for the analysis of ADA .claims.63 First, the EEOC or the
court must determine that the distinctiqn made . by the insurer or
employer is a disability-based distinction.64 Second, the insurer or em
ployer must establish that it has met the terms of § 501(c); that is, it
must demonstrate that the disability-based distinction is neither incon
sistent with state law nor a subterfuge.65 The EEOC defines subterfuge
as "disability-based disparate treatment that is not justified by the
risks or costs associated with the disability."66 The agency also demon
strates the safe harbor's limitations by offering a list of possible "busi
ness/insurance justifications" for disability-based distinctions.67 First,
the respondent may show that the distinction is based on legitimate
actuarial data or actual or reasonably anticipated experience and that
physical or mental conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or
experience are also similarly distinguished.68 Second, the insurer or
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
60. See 28

C.F.R. § 36 (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2000).

61. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO
DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (1993)
(hereinafter EEOC INTERIM GUIDANCE).
62. See id. at 3-4.
63. For a good summary, see generally D'Andra Millsap, Sex, Lies, and Health
Insurance: Employer-Provided Health Insurance Coverage of Abortion and Infertility
Services and the A DA , 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 51 (1996).
64.

See EEOC INTERIM G UIDANCE, supra note 61, at 2-3.

65. See id. at 4. It is also noteworthy that the agency places the burden on the in
surer/employer to prove that its actions are not a subterfuge. See id. at 9. The agency views
the safe harbor as an affirmative defense. See id. 'It justifies the placement of the burden on
the insurer or employer because it "has control of the risk assessment, actuarial, and/or
claims data relied upon in adopting the challenged disability based distinction" and thus,
"has the greatest access to the relevant facts." Id. at 9-10.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id.
68. Id. For instance, if an insurer refused to provide coverage to a disabled individual
with multiple sclerosis, such a distinction would be justified if the insurer could demonstrate
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employer may show that the distinction is necessary to ensure the fis
cal soundness and financial solvency of the plan.69 Third, it may dem
onstrate that the distinction is necessary to avoid a drastic increase in
premiums or a drastic alteration in benefits.70 To support these justifi
cations with actuarial data, an insurer must provide a detailed explana
tion of the rationale for the disability-based distinction along with its
actuarial conclusions, assumptions, and data.71
The EEOC indicates that the reach of the safe harbor should be
limited not only by the existence of any actuarial data or experience to
justify a disability-based distinction, but also by the nature of this data
or experience.72 Insurers and employers may not discriminate against
the disabled by relying on evidence of typical variations because risk
variations are an inevitable part of the insurance business. Rather, the
safe harbor protects insurers and employers only when risk variations
are excessive and atypical,73 or will lead to drastic alterations in plan
characteristics or premiums.74 By focusing on the nature of evidence to
support a disability-based distinction, in addition to its existence, the
agency creates an evidentiary standard that insurers must meet to
make distinctions under the safe harbor. As a result, the agency places
clear limits on the reach of the safe harbor.
Some courts and commentators have objected to reliance on the
EEOC's interpretations of the safe harbor because they do not believe
that courts should defer to the agency's interpretations.75 Although the
EEOC's interpretations have not been published in the Federal
Register nor endured notice and comment procedures, courts should
defer to the Interim Guidance. The Supreme Court stated in
Christenson v. Harris County and reiterated in United States v. Mead
that administrative interpretations by an enforcing agency are entitled

with actuarial data that the costs of treating such an individual are inordinately high and that
it treats all other conditions with similar actuarial data in the same way.
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 11.
72. See id. at 11-13.
73. See id. at 12 ("The respondent, for example, may prove that it limited coverage f or
the treatment of a discrete group of disabilities because continued unlimited coverage would
have been so expensive as to cause the health insurance plan to become financially insolvent,
and there was no nondisability-based health insurance plan alteration that would have
avoided insolvency.").
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1065 (1996) (refusing to defer to the
EEOC's definition of subterfuge). Pursuant to Chevron Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), federal agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes are given defer
ence only if they have gone through formal rulemaking procedures.
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to Skidmore-style deference.76 Though less deferential than Chevron
style deference, Skidmore-style deference calls for adherence to
agency views proportional to their "power to persuade. "77 The
EEOC's interpretations of .the safe harbor have the power to
persuade.78
C.

Other Health Care Statutes and Safe Harbors

The safe harbors in other health care statutes and regulations
provide a good analogy for the ADA and further support this Note's
argument that Congress intended the ADA safe harbor to provide a
narrow exception.
Health care antitrust laws are designed to ensure competition in
the health care market.79 In the early 1990s, the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission, the agencies responsible for
antitrust law enforcement,80 became concerned that strict laws were
precluding potentially beneficial integration in the health care indus
try.81 As a result, in 1994 the agencies carved out nine safety zones to
traditional health care antitrust laws.82 These safety zones offer
exemptions for certain hospital and physician mergers and joint ven-

76. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 308-309 (2001); Christenson v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("[I]nterpretations contained in formats such as opinion
letters are 'entitled to respect' under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co." (quoting 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
77. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
78. A more detailed discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this Note.
79. See Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Issues in Health Care Reform, 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
1045, 1053-55 (1994) ("Historically, antitrust law has promoted competition in health care.");
Amy Woodhall, Note, Integrated Delivery Systems: Reforming the Conflict Among the
Federal Referral, Tax Exemption, and Antitrust Laws, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 206 (1995). Health
care antitrust laws include several different statutes: Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1988)
(prohibiting contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade); the Robinson
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988) (governing price discrimination); the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1988) (prohibiting mergers and acquisitions which substantially lessen competi
tion or tend toward monopoly); 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988) (prohibiting exclusive dealings and
tying arrangements that substantially lessen competition); and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) (governing unfair methods of competition that re
strict market structures). See Woodhall, supra note 79, at 205 n.126.
80. See ERNEST GELLHORN AND WILLIAM E. KovACIC, ANTITRUST LAw AND
ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 29 (1994).
81. See DEP T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCING
POLICY AND ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST,
TRADE REGULATION REP. (CCH) 'D 13,151 (Sept. 1994) (hereinafter DOJ & FTC
STATEMENT] ("The (1993 policy] statements [were] designed to provide education and
instruction to the health care community in a time of tremendous change, and to resolve, as
completely as possible, the problem of antitrust uncertainty that [some have said) might
deter mergers or joint ventures that would promise to reduce health. care costs."); KENNETH
R. WING, ET AL., THE LAW AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 902 (1998).
'

82. See DOJ & FTC STATEMENT, supra note 81.
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tures.83 One year later, the agencies expanded the antitrust safety
zones.84 Though the safety zones were designed to limit the application
of antitrust law in the health care arena, they offer only narrow and
limited exceptions to antitrust law.85 For example, one safety zone
permits the formation of physician network joint ventures if the
network includes twenty percent or less of the physicians in each spe
cialty who practice within a geographic market and share substantial
financial risk.86 In addition, the agencies created an exemption for
joint ventures designed to share high technology or other expensive
medical equipment. The safety zone calls for a joint venture among
the fewest number of hospitals necessary to "allow the hospitals to
recover the costs of acquiring, operating and marketing the services
provided by the equipment."87
Congress also carved out narrow safe harbors to fraud and abuse
laws.88 Despite the burden that fraud places on the health care sys
tem,89 Congress was concerned that broad fraud and abuse laws would
result in the inappropriate prosecutions of legitimate providers.90 As a
result, in the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection

83. See id.
84. See Agencies Clarify Reach of Health Care Guidelines, Statement of Assistant
Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 357 (BNA) (Sept 29,
1994) (The agencies were still concerned that "procompetitive transactions were not hap
pening because of fear of antitrust violations.").
85. See DOJ & FTC STATEMENT, supra note 81.
86. See id.
87. Id. Even after the 1995 expansion, the safety zones remain narrow exemptions. For
instance, the safety zone for hospital joint ventures for the sharing of high technology or
other expensive equipment was expanded to include not only new, but existing, equipment.
Similarly, the agencies allowed physician network joint ventures that comprised thirty
percent or less of the physicians in a given specialty in a geographic market as long as the
network was non-exclusive, meaning that the participating physicians were permitted to be
long to more than one network.
88. Fraud and abuse is extremely varied in its form. Fraudulent cle.ims can be submitted
for care never provided or care provided but not required. In addition, "upcoding," in which
providers bill for a more complex service than is required, has become a common form of
fraud. Fraud is prosecuted under a number of different statutes, including the Stark
Amendments to the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989 and the Civil False Claims Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1 395nn (1997); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l)-(7) (1997). The Medicare-Medicaid
Antifraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977 make kickbacks and self-referral schemes illegal.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1 320a-7b(b)(l)(B) (1997).
89. Some estimate that ten percent of the nation's health care costs can be attributed to
fraud. See Fraud and Abuse: Medicare Continues To Be Vulnerable to Exploitation by Un
scrupulous Providers: Testimony Before the Senate Special Comm on Aging, in U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, T-HEHS-96-7 (Nov. 2, 1995) (testimony of Sarah F.
Jaggar, Director, Health, Financing, and Public Health Issues, Health, Education, and Hu
man Services Division); WING ET AL., supra note 81, at 909.
90. This concern became even more real when the Third Circuit held in United States v.
Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d. Cir. 1985), that a payment could be considered fraudulent even if it
had legitimate purposes if it was also intended to induce future referrals.
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Act of 1987 ,91 Congress authorized the Office of the Inspector General
at the Department of Health and Human Services to carve out specific
safe harbors to the antikickback law.92 Despite their broad purpose,
these safe harbors were narrowly written and have limited applica
tion.93 For example, the statute allows for certain types of investment
interests by providers in health care enterprises. Providers may main
tain investments only in large publicly traded health care companies if
the shareholders' dividends do not increase as a result of shareholder
referrals.94 Similarly, the safe harbors allow for certain kinds of refer
ral services as long as the fee paid for the service is to support the
operation of the service and does not reflect the value of the referral
itself. The service also must disclose to all consumers its relationship
with the physician.95
The language of the safe harbor, its legislative history, agency in
terpretations, and other health care statutes indicate that Congress
intended the safe harbor to offer insurers a narrow and limited exemp
tion from the ADA. To read the statute more broadly is inconsistent
with Congress' desire to protect the disabled.
II.

THE COURTS ' 0VEREXPANSION OF THE SAFE HARBOR

This Part argues that in construing the safe harbor broadly courts
have undermined Congress's intent to create a limited exemption from
the ADA.96 Section II.A demonstrates that in safe harbor cases courts
have interpreted the safe harbor provision broadly. In doing so, courts
have ignored the statutory language, legislative history, and agency in
terpretations which indicate that Congress intended the provision to
be applied narrowly.97 This section also identifies a few cases in which
91. Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987).
92. See WING ET AL., supra note 81, at 915.
93. See infra note 95.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)-(e) (1997).
95. See id. In order to respond to the growing importance of managed care, the agency
carved out two new managed care safe harbors in 1992. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(1)-(m)
(1997). Again, these safe harbors offer very narrow exceptions to the underlying antikick
back laws. The first allows health plans that have contracted with the government under
Medicare or Medicaid to offer incentives to enrollees, such as increased benefits or
decreased deductibles. The second protects some negotiated price reduction agreements be
tween health plans and providers. In order to be protected by the safe harbor, agreements
must (1) reflect the provider's reduction of usual charges, (2) be in writing, and (3) exist
solely to allow the provider to furnish enrollees with services covered under Medicare and
Medicaid.
96. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989).
97. See supra Part I(A); see also, e.g., Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank, 199 F.3d 99, 102104 (2d Cir. 1999) (ignoring the statutory language, legislative history and agency interpreta
tions in interpreting the meaning of the term ('subterfuge') as defined in Pub. Employee
Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (198�)); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611-12
(3d Cir. 1998) (same).
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courts have interpreted the provision in keeping with Congress's
intent. Section 11.B evaluates courts' reasons for a broad interpreta
tion and concludes that these reasons are inadequate.
A.

An Examination of Safe Harbor Cases98

An examination of cases in which defendants have relied on the
safe harbor provision to absolve themselves of ADA liability reveals
that courts have overextended the safe harbor in four ways: first, by
not requiring defendants to present evidence to justify a disability
based distinction; second, by viewing the safe harbor as an irrebutable
defense; third, by relying on an incorrect definition of "subterfuge;"99
and fourth, by failing to keep the underlying purposes of the ADA in
mind when interpreting the reach of the provision. The result of
courts' failures to adhere to congressional intent is that a defendant
need only plead the safe harbor defense to be assured of a judgment in
its favor; that is, cases decided under the safe harbor essentially have a
predetermined outcome. 100
First, many courts have inappropriately broadened the reach of the
safe harbor provision by finding in favor of defendant insurers in
ADA cases without requiring them to provide evidence to justify
disability-based distinctions. The protections of the safe harbor are
limited by the defendant's ability to offer actuarial or experience
based evidence. 101 The courts have not, however, required defendants
to provide such evidence. In Leonard F. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

98. This discussion relies on cases brought in eight federal circuits. The cases are largely
motions by defendant insurers and employers for dismissal or summary judgment, or appeals
by plaintiffs from grants of dismissals or summary judgment. The plaintiffs are all qualified
disabled individuals, suffering from conditions such as muscular dystrophy, depression,
AIDS, and panic anxiety disorder, who have been denied health or disability insurance
benefits because of their disabilities. See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d
1042 (9th Cir. 2000); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2000); Leonard, 199
F.3d at 99; Rogers v. Dep't. of Health and Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1998). For
the statute's definition of a "qualified disabled individual," see infra note 1 43.
99. Courts rely on the Supreme Court's definition of "subterfuge" in Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 167 (1989) (defining "subterfuge" as "a
scheme, stratagem, or artifice of evasion"). In Betts, the plaintiff brought a claim against her
employer challenging an age-based employment decision under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 -624 (1994).
100. It is worth noting again that not all courts have granted summary judgment simply
because the defendant pied the safe harbor. See infra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3,
at 71 (1 990) ("[T]he ADA requires that underwriting and classification of risks be based on
sound actuarial principles or be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.");
S. REP. No. 1 01-116, at 85 (1 989) ("[T]he plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to con
tinue to insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual . . .
except where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles
or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.").
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Co. , 102 the plaintiff sued his insurer under the ADA because the in

surer provided him with a policy that limited coverage for his mental
disability to two years without limiting coverage for other kinds of
care.103 The Second Circuit relied on the safe harbor to conclude that
the defendant insurer was exempt fr om the ADA.104 The court did not
require the defendant to provide any actuarial or experience-based
evidence to prove that the plaintiff's disability justified a disability
benefits cap.105 It reasoned that neither the statute nor its legislative
history require insurers to "base their decisions with respect to
disabled individuals on 'sound actuarial principles.' "106 Similarly, in
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp. , 1f17 the plaintiff claimed that a similar
benefits cap on coverage for mental disabilities violated the ADA.108
The Third Circuit held that the safe harbor provision protected the de
fendant from liability and did not require the employer or insurer to
offer actuarial evidence or experience to justify the cap.109 The court
argued that such a requirement would have an improper and dramatic
effect on the insurance industry.no Finally, in Rogers v. Department of
Health and Environmental Control, 1 1 1 the Fourth Circuit upheld a dis
missal in favor of the defendant based on the safe harbor, and did not
require the defendant to provide evidence that justified the denial of
benefits for treatment of the plaintiff's panic anxiety disorder.n2 These
cases illustrate courts' lack of adherence to congressional intent by

102. Leonard, 199 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999).
1 03. Id. at 1 00.
104. Id. at 107. The plaintiff, disabled by a mental illness, alleged that MetLife violated
the ADA by contracting with the plaintiff's employer to provide a health insurance policy
that limited coverage for mental disabilities to two years without limiting coverage of physi
cal disabilities. See id. at 1 00.
105. See id. at 1 06 ("[W]e agree with the district court that . . . [MetLife's long term dis
ability policy] is exempt from regulation under the Act pursuant to the safe harbor provision
of Section 501(c), regardless [of] whether it was based on actuarial evidence.").
106. Id. at 104.
107. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff, disabled by a mental disorder, brought an
ADA claim challenging the defendant's insurance policy which provided only two years of
mental health benefits but unlimited physical benefits. See Ford, 145 F.3d. at 603.
108. See id. at 603.
1 09. See id. at 61 2.
1 1 0. See id. ("[W]e will not construe section 501 (c) to require a seismic shift in the in
surance business, namely requiring insurers to justify their coverage plans in court after a
mere allegation by a plaintiff.").
1 1 1 . 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1 999). The plaintiff, disabled by panic anxiety disorder,
claimed that the defendant's insurance plan's disparity in benefits between physical and
mental disabilities violated the ADA. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 432.
1 12. See id. at 437 ("[W]e do not find anything in § 501(c) of the ADA . . . that requires
a plan sponsor or administrator to justify a plan's separate classification of mental disability
with actuarial data.").
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failing to require defendants to present actuarial or experience-based
evidence in safe harbor cases.
Second, several courts have overextended the intended reach of
the safe harbor provision by treating the provision as an irrebutable
defense to a plaintiff's ADA claim. Congress did not state which party
should bear the burden of proof of exemption based on the safe har
bor. The EEOC, however, specified that the burden should lie with
the defendant, the party that has the greatest access to actuarial and
experience-based data that may justify a distinction.1 13 Such placement
comports with accepted standards that the burden of proof of a de
fense to liability lie with the defendant.1 14 Just as the defendant must
provide evidence to meet its burden, the plaintiff has the opportunity
to provide evidence to rebut the defense to liability."5 When defen
dants plead the safe harbor defense, however, courts have found plain
tiffs' attempts to rebut inappropriate and futile. In Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co.,11 6 the Seventh Circuit remarked that it was
"odd" that the plaintiff made attempts to rebut the defendant's
reliance on the safe harbor provision, particularly considering that the
provision was designed for the benefit of the defendant.1 1 7 Similarly, in
Rogers, the Fourth Circuit suggested that the plaintiff's reliance on a
rebuttal of the safe harbor defense was strange because the "provision
[is] actually intended for the protection of those he sues."118 The result
of these courts' views is that a defendant's mere assertion of the safe
harbor defe nse is enough to guarantee it protection from liability. In
this way, the provisions' reach becomes much broader than Congress
intended.
Third, courts have expanded the reach of the safe harbor by rely
ing inappropriately on the Supreme Court's definition of subterfuge
in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") in Public
Employees Retirement System v. Betts.119 Relying on its prior holding

113. See EEOC INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 61, at 9-10.
1 14. See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL
PROCEDURE 224 (2d ed. 1 994).
115. See id. at 225.
116. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs, both disabled by AIDS-related condi
tions, challenged the disparity between the defendants' low AIDS benefits cap as compared
to a much higher cap on all other conditions.
11 7. See Doe, 179 F.3d at 562 ("[S]ection 501(c) is obviously intended for the benefit of
insurance companies rather than plaintiffs and it may seem odd therefore to find the plaintiff
placing such heavy weight on what is in effect a defense to liability.").
118. 174 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 1 999).
119. 492 U.S. 158 (1 989). The ADEA provided that an employer was permitted to dis
criminate against an employee based on her age if it were "observ[ing] the terms of . . . any
bona fide employee benefit plan . . . which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this
chapter . . . . " 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1994). For examples of courts' reliance on the Betts
definition in the ADA context, see Ford v. Schering Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir.
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under the ADEA in United Airlines Inc. v. McMann120 and its
understanding of the plain language and ordinary meaning of the
word, in Betts, the Court defined subterfuge as "a scheme, plan,
stratagem, or artifice of evasion."121 The Court held that subterfuge
required a specific and malicious intent to evade the underlying stat
ute.122 The Betts definition conflicts with the definition found in the
ADA's legislative history and agency guidance that define subterfuge
as discrimination not justified by actuarial data.123
Despite the conflict between the Betts definition of subterfuge and
the use of the term in the ADA, courts have offered several arguments
in favor of incorporating the Betts definition into the ADA. First, the
ADA was passed one year after Betts was decided.124 Courts argue that
rules of statutory interpretation support reliance on the Betts defini
tion because Congress was aware of the Supreme Court's decision
when drafting the ADA and did not redefine the term in the statute.125
Second, courts have argued that the plain meaning of the safe harbor
statutory text supports the Betts definition.126 The cost-justification
definition of subterfuge depends on an analysis of the legislative
history and agency interpretation. Some argue that, under traditional

1998), Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Krauel v. Iowa Methodist
Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1996).
120. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
121. Betts, 492 U.S. at 167 (quoting McMann, 434 U.S. at 203).
122. See id. at 171.
123. See supra notes 47-74 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3,
at 71 (1990); s. REP. No. 101-116, at 84-5 (1989); EEOC INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 61,
at 11 (" 'Subterfuge' refers to disability-based disparate treatment that is not justified by the
risks or costs associated with the disability.").
124. Betts was decided in 1989. Betts, 492 U.S. at 158. The ADA was passed in 1990. 42
u.s.c. § 12101(b) (1994).
125. See Ford v. Schering Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1998); Modderno v.
King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[W)hen Congress chose the term 'subterfuge' for
the insurance safe-harbor of the ADA, it was on full alert as to what the Court understood
the word to mean and possessed (obviously) a full grasp of the linguistic devices available to
avoid that meaning."); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996)
("Had Congress intended to reject the Betts interpretation of subterfuge when it enacted the
ADA, it could have done so expressly by incorporating language for that purpose into the
bill that Congress voted on and the President signed."); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 581 (1978) ("[W)here, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a
prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation
given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute."); Standard Oil
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) ("[W)here words are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country
they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the con
trary."); ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 265 (arguing that courts should pre
sume that Congress uses a term consistently across statutes).
126. See, e.g., Ford, 145 F.3d at 611 (arguing that the definition forwarded in Betts is the
"ordinary meaning" of subterfuge).
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rules of statutory interpretation, the legislative history should not be
used to interpret the text, if the language of the text is unambiguous.127
When the intent of Congress is known, however, the legislative
intent, as evidenced in the legislative history, may override the plain
meaning of the words.128 The Betts definition does not apply to the
ADA because it conflicts with dear legislative intent. The legislative
history indicates that Congress intended the term subterfuge to incor
porate a cost justification requirement into the safe harbor, not a spe
cific intent requirement.129 In addition, four members of Congress in
dicated in statements on the Senate and House floor that they did not
intend the Betts definition to apply in the ADA context. Senator
Kennedy stated that "the term 'subterfuge' is used in the ADA to
denote a means of evading the purposes of the ADA. Under its plain
meaning, the term does not connote there must be some malicious or
purposeful intent to evade the ADA . . . ."130 Also, Representative
Owens stated that, "Subterfuge does not mean that there must be
some malicious or purposeful intent to evade the ADA . . . ."131 These
statements and the legislative history rebut the presumption that the
Betts definition should apply because Congress was aware of it when
drafting the ADA.

1 27. This viewpoint is described as the "new textualism." It is the view that "[w]hen the
text is relatively clear, interpreters should not even consider oth�r evidence of specific legis
lative intent or general purpose." ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 1 0, at 228.
1 28. See Dewsnupp v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1 992) (rejecting interpreting
ambiguous statutory language based on its plain meaning in favor of construing the statute in
accordance with the intent of Congress as indicated in pre-Code law and legislative history);
Doukas v Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 431 (D.N.H. 1996) ("[T]his case represents
one of those perhaps rare situations when the legislative intent is so clearly and unmistaka
bly expressed that it can overcome the customary meaning of the words within the statute.");
ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 228; 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (1992) ("[E]ven if the words of the statute are plain
and unambiguous on their face the court may still look to the legislative history in construing
the statute . . . if there is a clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to the language of
the statute.").
129. See H.R. REP. No. lOL-485, pt. 3, at 70 (1990) ("[I]nsurers may continue to sell to
and underwrite individuals applying fo r life, health, or other insurance on an individually
underwritten basis . . . so long as the standards used are based on sound actuarial data and
not on speculation."); S. REP. NO. 101-1 1 6, at 85 (1989) ("[T]he plan may not refuse to
insure . . . except where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial
principles.").
130. 136 CONG. REC. Sl7378 (1990).
131. 136 CONG. REC. S17378 (1990). See also statements of Representative Edwards
that "subterfuge does not mean that there must be some malicious intent to evade the
ADA . . . ." 114 CONG. REC. H4624 (1990) and Representative Waxman that "there is no
requirement of an intent standard under the ADA." 114 CONG REC. H17290 (July 12, 1990).
Next to committee reports, explanatory statements by the sponsors or floor managers of
legislation are the most useful and reliable kind of legislative history. Statements by support
ers and opponents, however, carry less weight. See ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 10,
at 303-04.
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Fourth, courts have inappropriately expanded the reach of the safe
harbor provision by failing to keep the underlying purposes of the
ADA in mind when making decisions in safe harbor cases. The ADA
was enacted to end discrimination against the disabled.132 Congress
added the safe harbor to ensure that the insurance industry could con
tinue to underwrite and classify risks.133 In their discussions of the safe
harbor, the courts never address the issue of how to balance the con
tradictory purposes of the statute and one of its provisions. As a result,
they allow Congress's secondary intent - avoidance of disruption to
the insurance industry134 - to override the ADA's main purpose protection of the disabled.135 The result is an inappropriate expansion
of the reach of the safe harbor to protect distinctions made by insurers
and employers that violates the underlying purposes of the ADA.
Despite the courts' general overexpansion of the reach of the safe
harbor, several courts have suggested that the safe harbor provision
offers insurers a narrower exemption. In Henderson v. Bodine
Aluminum, lnc. ,136 the Eighth Circuit implied its support for a
narrower approach. The court suggested in dicta that an insurer's deci
sion to deny coverage of an autologous bone marrow transplant for
the treatment of breast cancer may violate the ADA, if not based on
sufficient actuarial evidence or experience.137 The court did not base
its decision to grant a preliminary injunction against the defendant in
surer on a safe harbor analysis.

132. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (intending to "provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring
persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life").
133. See id. at 84-85.
134. See id.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1 994).
136. 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1 995).
137. Henderson, 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff, Karen Henderson, sought a
preliminary injunction against her health plan and insurance providers to require the plan to
approve her physician's request for an autologous bone marrow transplant and a regimen of
high dose chemotherapy to treat her aggressive breast cancer. She claimed that her health
plan's denial of coverage was a violation of the ADA because the plan was willing to cover
the treatment for other types of cancer. The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's order
denying the preliminary injunction and remanded for entry of the injunction and for trial. It
also stated that it believed the plaintiffs ADA argument was sufficiently likely to succeed.
The defendant did not raise a safe harbor defense and therefore, the court did not directly
address the reach of the provision or its application to these facts. The courts suggested,
however, that the insurer's denial of coverage may violate the ADA. See id. at 960 (8th Cir.
1995) ("[I]f the evidence shows that a given treatment is non-experimental - that is, if it is
widespread, safe , and a significant improvement on traditional therapies - and the plan
provides the treatment for other conditions directly comparable to the one at issue, the de
nial of that treatment arguably violates the ADA.").
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Four federal district courts have explicitly interpreted the safe har
bor provision narrowly in concert with congressional intent.138 All have
held that the safe harbor requires an actuarial or cost-based justifica
tion for a disability-based distinction. In Cloutier v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America , 139 a California federal district court denied
the defendant insurer's motion for summary judgment based on the
plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the ADA for the denial of life
insurance coverage.140 The court found that the defendant did not
offer sufficient actuarial data to support its decision to deny cover
age.141 In Baker v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.,142 an Illinois federal
district court denied the defendant insurer's motion for dismissal of
the plaintiff's ADA claim.143 The court suggested that the insurer's de
cision to deny coverage was not justified under the safe harbor
because it was not based on considerations of underwriting or classi
fying risks.144 In Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,145 a New
Hampshire federal district court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment despite the defendant's inclusion of an affidavit of
one of its underwriters stating that the insurer's experience with bipo
lar disorder indicated that the disability presented an increased risk.146

138. See Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Doukas v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.H. 1 996); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No.
94C4416 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1 995); Piquard v. City of East
Peoria, 887 F. Supp. 1 1 06 (C.D. 111. 1995).
139. Cloutier, 964 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
140. See id. at 299. The plaintiff was an HIV-negative individual in a sexual relationship
with an HIV-positive partner. Id. The defendant denied the plaintiffs application for a life
insurance policy based on the defendant's sexual relationship. Id. The plaintiff had standing
to sue under the ADA because the statute prohibits discrimination against "an individual or
entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is
known to have a relationship or association." 42 U.S.C. § 1 2182(b)(l )(E) (1994). The plain
tiff's partner who was HIV-positive had a disability. See 964 F. Supp. at 301 .
141. See Cloutier, 964 F. Supp. at 305 ("The mere fact that a particular individual pres
ents a greater risk does not compel the conclusion that the individual presents an uninsur
able risk. Common sense suggests that an insurer that confronts a heterogeneous pool of ap
plicants merely consults actuarial tables to adjust its rates to account for varying levels of
risk presented by those applicants.").
142. 1 995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
143. See Baker, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103 at *l. The plaintiff was disabled by a sei
zure disorder that forced him to rely on the use of a wheelchair and an augmentative com
munication device. The defendant insurer denied the plaintiffs application for major medi
cal insurance on the basis of his disability. The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's claim.
144. See id. at *10 ("[T]he mere fact that an insurer decides to deny coverage because of
plaintiff's disability does not necessarily preclude a claim under the ADA. It is possible that
the decision to deny plaintiff coverage was not based on considerations of underwriting or
classifying risks, in which case plaintiff might be entitled to recover under the ADA.").
1 45. 950 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.H. 1996).
146. See Doukas, 950 F. Supp. at 429. The plaintiff suffered from bipolar disorder. As a
result, the defendant denied her application for disability insurance.
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The court f ound that the statement did not constitute sufficient actu
arial or experience-based evidence to justify a disability-based distinc
tion under the ADA.1 47 Finally, in Piquard v. City of East Peoria,148 an
Illinois federal district court held that the Betts definition should not
apply to the ADA because the legislative history confirms a cost justi
fication approach to the safe harbor.149 Its rejection of the Betts defini
tion supports a narrower interpretation of the safe harbor provision.
Though these four holdings are consistent with Congress's intention to
create a narrow and limited exception to the safe harbor, they are
atypical, have never been affirmed by an appellate court, and do not
represent the overall trend in the case law.
B.

Courts' Reasons for a Broad Interpretation

In addition to the courts' statutory justifications discussed above,
several courts offer additional reasons for interpreting the safe harbor
provision broadly. Overall, these reasons are inadequate and do not
justify an interpretation contrary to congressional intent.
First, courts may interpret the provision broadly because of their
reluctance to intervene in the business of the insurance industry.
Exemption under the safe harbor provision requires insurers to justify
disability-based distinctions with actuarial data or experience-based
evidence.150 As a result, in order to adhere to Congress's intent when
making decisions in safe harbor cases, courts must engage in an analy
sis of actuarial data and the risk classification methods of an insurance
company. Courts offer two reasons for their reluctance to conduct
such an analysis. They argue that the federal McCarran-Ferguson
Act151 reserves for the states the authority to regulate the "business of
insurance."152 If a federal court were to engage in a substantive analy147. See id. at 432. This case was heard by a district court in the First Circuit, a circuit
that has not yet heard a case in which a defendant raises a safe harbor defense. It is likely
that the First Circuit will also offer a narrow interpretation of the safe harbor and create a
circuit split, because it offe red an expansive view of Title III in Carparts Distribution Center
Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
148. 887 F. Supp. 1106 (C.D. Ill. 1995). Each of two plaintiffs suffe red from a disability
and, as a result, were denied the opportunity to participate in their employer's pension fund.
See id. at 1112.
149. See Piquard, 887 F. Supp. at 1123 ("It is important to note that the term 'subter·
fuge,' as used in the ADA, should not be interpreted in the manner in which the Supreme
Court interpreted the term in Betts. The term 'subterfuge' is used in the ADA to denote a
means of evading the purposes of the ADA."). Though Piquard was not overturned, the
Seventh Circuit has interpreted the safe harbor broadly in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
150. See supra Part I.
151. 15 u.s.c. § 1011 (1994).·
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012{a) {1994) ("The business of insurance, and every person en
gaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business."). Congress intended the McCarran-Ferguson Act to allocate
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sis of a defendant's decision to deny coverage, it would violate the
Act's prohibition.153 The courts' proffered reliance on the McCarran
Ferguson prohibition is inadequate, however, because the Act con
tains a relevant exception. The prohibition against the federal regula
tion of insurance applies unless a federal statute ''specifically relates to
the business of insurance," in which case the federal law supersedes
the state law.154 Federal courts can evaluate an insurer's denial of
coverage without violating the McCarran-Ferguson prohibition
because the ADA's safe harbor was specifically enacted to regulate
insurance.155
In addition, courts elect to construe the safe harbor broadly, elimi
nating the need to make actuarial assessments because they are reluc
tant to engage in an analysis of actuarial or experience-based data.
Courts are reluctant to perform such analyses because they lack spe
cialized knowledge and experience.156 Though it is understandable that
judges may feel ill-equipped to make such actuarial assessments, this
concern does not justify an inappropriately broad interpretation of the
statute. In addition, their reluctance may be unjustified because courts
are experienced at evaluating evidence for which they are not specifi
cally trained to evaluate.157 For example, judges have played an
increasingly significant role in evaluating and admitting expert scien
tific evidence.158 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals lnc. ,159 the

properly the regulatory and taxing power over the insurance industry between the federal
government and the states. Congress wanted to assure state regulation of the "business of
insurance" for two reasons: first, the state governments are "closer" to the insurance indus
try and second, the states are experienced at regulating the industry. See JERRY, supra note
36, at 24, 57.
153. See Doe, 1 79 F.3d at 564 ("If the ADA is fully applicable, insurers will have to
defend their AIDS caps by reference to section 501 (c). and the federal courts will then find
themselves regulating the health insurance industry, which McCarran- Ferguson tells them
not to do."); Ford v. Schering Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 , 611-12 (3d Cir. 1 998) ("The
second reason that Ford's argument must fail is that it ignores our statutory duty under the
Mc Carran- Ferguson Act regarding insurance cases.").
154. 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 01 2(b) (1994) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .");
Geetter, supra note 11, at 535.
155. See JERRY, supra note 36, at 67 (suggesting that the exception to the McCarran
Ferguson prohibition applies even when only one section of a statute "specifically relates" to
the business of insurance).
156. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 612 ("[ R]equiring insurers to justify their coverage plans
elevates this court to the position of super-actuary. This court is clearly not equipped to
become the watchdog of the insurance business.").
1 57. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 147 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A trial
judge must decide rather quickly whether to send a case to a jury without pausing to conduct
a graduate seminar in efficient-market economics.").
158. Although Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), does not re
quire judges to evaluate scientific evidence as would a factfinder, it does require judges to
engage in sophisticated analyses of scientific evidence in order to determine its reliability.
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Supreme Court assigned judges the role of "ensuring that an expert's
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
task at hand."160 This role often requires judges to evaluate unfamiliar
evidence, a task f or which they may be untrained.1 61 In his dissent,
Justice Rehnquist argued that Daubert imposed on judges "the obliga
tion . . . to become amateur scientists in order to perform [this]
role."162 The Supreme Court's rejection of Justice Rehnquist's concern
indicates that the Court believed that judges were qualified to make
judgments based on scientific evidence. The same reasoning applies to
judges' evaluations of actuarial and experience-based insurance data.
Second, judges interpret the safe harbor provision broadly because
of their beliefs that ADA claims are often illegitimate and brought by
plaintiffs not truly deserving of a legal remedy.163 Judges are likely
concerned that holdings in favor of ADA plaintiffs will encourage a
flood of illegitimate claims that would clog up their dockets.164 As ex
pected, the opinions do not readily reveal evidence of a court's belief
that a complainant lacks conviction. At least one judge has expressed
his disdain for a plaintiff's allegation of an ADA violation by an in
surer.1 65 The existence of judicial hostility toward the ADA is further
evidenced by judges' expressions of concern, in other contexts, that
ADA plaintiffs may be using the statute to take advantage of defen
dants.166 In addition, the argument that courts view many ADA claims
See id. at 592-95; see also RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 1044 (3d ed. 2000).

159. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
1 60. Id. at 597; see also LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 285 (2000).
161. A result of this new role has been the proliferation of articles and manuals to assist
judges in the task of evaluating scientific evidence. For example, judges will often rely on the
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed.
2000), available at http:f/air.fjc.gov/publidpdf.nsf/lookup/sciman01.pdf/$file/sciman01.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2002). See LEMPERT ET AL. supra note 158, at 1044 n.79.
162. 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
163. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 260 (2001) [hereinafter Colker, Winning] ("[J]udicial attitude towards a
statute may be the most important predictor of litigation results.").
164. See Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 510 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissent
ing) ("It has also been suggested that if we treat as 'disabilities' impairments that may be
mitigated by measures as ordinary and expedient as wearing eyeglasses, a flood of litigation
will ensue.").
165. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Accordingly,
we will not construe section 501(c) to require a seismic shift in the insurance business,
namely requiring insurers to justify their coverage plans [with actuarial data] in court after a
mere allegation by a plaintiff." (emphasis added)).
166. See, e.g., Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1 989) (Whipple, J.,
dissenting) ("I agree with the Court that the Government should bend over backwards to
accommodate the handicapped. However, this does not mean the Government should be a
floor mat to be walked on by individuals intent on taking advantage of the Government's
perceived inability to discharge non-productive or unqualified employees . . . . ").
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as illegitimate is · consistent with the recent overall narrowing of the
reach of the ADA.167 Judges' hostility toward the ADA's wide
reaching purposes is an improper reason for a broad interpretation of
the safe harbor.
III. APPLICATION OF A NEW STANDARD
This final Part offers a solution to courts' failures to adhere to the
intent of Congress when interpreting the safe harbor provision. It pro
poses that, in safe harbor cases, courts adopt the undue hardship de
fense standard used to determine whether an employer is exempt from
the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement in Title I of the
statute.1 68 Section III.A of this Part examines the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement and the undue hardship defense. Section
III.B proposes that courts apply the undue hardship standard in safe
harbor cases and demonstrates how the application of this standard
will permit courts to remain faithful to Congress's intent. Section III.C
offers several justifications for the adoption of the undue hardship
standard. Section IIl.D responds to several objections to the applica
tion of the undue hardship standard in safe harbor cases.
A.

The Undue Hardship Defense

Title I of the ADA requires that employers make reasonable
accommodations for all employees with disabilities.169 Reasonable ac
commodations may include, but are not limited to, changing physical
facilities, offering part-time or modified work schedules, reassigning to

167. See e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (holding
that those with correctable disabilities do not qualify as disabled under the ADA); Krauel v.
Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that infertility is not a
disability under the ADA).
168. The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func
tions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. §
1 21 11 (8). By prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability, the
statute requires employers and public accommodations to make reasonable accommoda
tions. The failure to make a reasonable accommodation, without demonstration of undue
hardship, constitutes an ADA violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) ("[T]he term 'discriminate'
includes . . . not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."). If the employer or public
accommodation can demonstrate an undue hardship, however, it need not provide a
reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 2(b)(5)(A).
169. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112. See generally Stephen F. Stuhlberg, Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do
Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. CtN. L. REV. 131 1 , 1 313-1 4 (1991).
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a vacant position, or providing qualified readers or interpreters.170 An
employer who fails to offer a qualified employee a reasonable accom
modation has violated the ADA.1 71 Nonetheless, the statute permits an
employer or public accommodation to deny a reasonable accommoda
tion if it is an "undue hardship" or "undue burden;"172 that is, the em170. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 16 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(2) (2000). The regulations state that
reasonable accommodations may include modifications in the job application process, the
work environment, the manner in which work is perf ormed, or the employee's ability to
enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0) (2000) . The
EEOC views the reasonable accommodation requirement as a means by which barriers to
the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability are removed or allevi
ated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, Interpretive Guidance on Title l of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Public accommodations are similarly bound to
provide disabled individuals with reasonable modifications to ensure that they have equal
access under Title III of the ADA. The regulations require that a public accommodation
take steps to ensure that the disabled are not excluded or denied services through the provi
sion of "auxiliary aids and services." See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) ("[T)he term 'discriminate' includes . . . not making rea
sonable accommodations . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommo
dation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity."); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303. The undue hardship defense originated under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
broadly prohibited discrimination against individuals with disabilities by all entities receiving
federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); S. REP. NO. 1297, at 39 (1974) (Section 504
"theref ore constitutes the establishment of broad government policy that programs receiving
federal financial assistance shall be operated without discrimination on the basis of
handicap."); H.R. REP. NO. 1 01-485, pt. 3, at 26 (1990) ("Section 504 bars discrimination by
recipients of Federal financial assistance against persons with disabilities in all the recipient 's
programs and activities."). The statute included the reasonable accommodation requirement
adopted by Congress in the ADA, but did not explicitly include a hardship defense. See
Armen Merjian, Bad Decisions Make Bad Decisions: Davis, Arline, and Improper
Application of the Undue Financial Burden Defense Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 B ROOK. L. REV. 105, 113 (1 999). The hardship defense
first appeared in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's regulations
promulgated in 1978 and was written into the Act in the 1978 amendments. The regulations
state that employers must "make reasonable accommodation . . . unless the recipient [of fed
eral financial assistance) can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of its program." See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1998); Amendments to
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 ("In fashioning an
equitable or affirmative action remedy under [Section 501], a court may take into account
the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation."). These provi
sions limited an employer's duty to accommodate to instances where an accommodation
proves unreasonably costly. A hardship defense was independently created by the Supreme
Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The Court stated
that reasonable accommodations would ordinarily be expected as long as they did not
impose "undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State." Id. at 412. This view was
reiterated in later cases. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1984) (denying a
remedy to disabled plaintiffs challenging Tennessee's proposal to reduce the number of
inpatient hospital days covered by Medicaid under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act);
Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (requiring that the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare provide three blind individuals with readers).
Title II of the ADA, which applied to public services, adopted the undue hardship defense
that existed under the Rehabilitation Act. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 ("[T)itle I I
incorporates the duty set f orth i n the regulation f or Sections 501, 503 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to provide a 'reasonable accommodation ' that does not constitute an
'undue hardship. ' ").

868

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 1 01:840

ployer need not accommodate the disabled employee if the needed
accommodation is too burdensome, either financially or administra
tively .173 Congress explicitly defined undue hardship as "significant dif
ficulty or expense."174
The burden of proving undue hardship rests with the defendant
because the undue hardship defense is an affirmative defense to a
claim of discrimination under the ADA.175 Initially, the plaintiff bears
the burden of demonstrating that an accommodation is generally rea
sonable. Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant may show
that the accommodation, though generally reasonable, constitutes an
undue hardship because of the employer's specific circumstances.176 If
the defendant meets its burden, it is absolved of liability under the
ADA.
Neither Congress nor the EEOC has provided a bright line rule as
to the level of hardship that meets the defendant's burden. In fact,
Congress explicitly rejected proposals for a clear standard in favor of

173. See Mary Kate Kearney, The A DA, Respiratory Disabilities and Smoking: Can
Smokers at Burger King Really Have it Their Way?, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 23 (2000) . For

example, an employer may argue that the cost of installing an elevator for a disabled indi
vidual is too costly and presents an undue hardship.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 121ll (10)(A).
175. See Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 653 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1 180,
1 188 (D.C. Cir. 1993); H.R. REP. No. 1 01-485, pt. 3, p. 26 ("Like Section 504 of the Rehabili
tation Act, the burden is on the employer to demonstrate that the needed accommodation
would cause an undue hardship."); Thomas Simmons, The A DA Prima Facie Plaintiff A
Critical Overview of Eighth Circuit Case Law, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 804 (1999) ("[T]he
undue hardship defense is just that - a defense - and the burden of establishing it rests
wholly with the defendant."); Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 121 (1990) ("[T]he employer has
the burden of establishing undue hardship by a preponderance of the evidence."); Wendy
Voss, Note, Employing the Alcoholic Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 33
WM . & MARY L. REV. 895, 930 (1992) ("The employer, in turn, should bear the burden of
assessing whether the requested accommodation would create an undue hardship."). The
circuits are split as to the actual placement of the burdens of persuasion and production. A
full discussion of this controversy is beyond the scope of this Note because all agree that the
burden of proving undue hardship falls on the defendant. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch.
Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1995); Jason Zarin, Beyond the Bright Line: Consideration of
Externalities, the Meaning of Undue Hardship, and the Allocation of the Burden of Proof
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 511, 527-532

(1998).
1 76. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1 999); LaPorta v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 767 (W.D. Mich. 2001 ); Kearney, supra note 173,
at 8 ("If the plaintiff establishes that the proposed modification is generally reasonable, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the modification would not be reason
able."). There is a fine line between the plaintiff's burden of showing reasonableness and the
defendant's burden of showing hardship. The line is fine because evidence used to support
reasonableness may also indicate whether there is an undue hardship. See Simmons, supra
note 175, at 804-05. The burdens differ, however, in that the plaintiff must present "a rather
generalized inquiry which focuses on the method of accommodation" whereas the defendant
must present particular evidence based on an "individualized inquiry." See id. at 805.
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retaining a flexible one.177 While the burden is not fixed, the statute
and legislative history indicate that it is significant.178 The legislative
history states that the duty to accommodate creates a more substantial
obligation than the duty to remove physical barriers in existing build
ings, which is limited to "readily achievable" barriers. '79 In addition, a
defendant cannot show that an accommodation presents an undue
hardship because of a mere de minimis cost180 or because it presents an
inconvenience.181 The defendant is not required, however, to demon
strate a hardship so great that providing the accommodation would
ruin his business. 1 82
Agency interpretations provide additional support f or the place
ment of a significant burden on the defendant. The EEOC states that
a defendant's claim of undue hardship must be supported by evidence
of a defendant's individualized circumstances that demonstrate that a
requested accommodation would present a significant difficulty or ex·

177. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41 ("The Committee rejected an amendment
which would have set a fixed limit of over 10% of the disabled employee's salary as a per se
undue hardship."); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN
EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE 58 n.1 1 3 (1 999) [hereinafter EEOC
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMODATION] ("[T]he House of
Representatives rejected a cost-benefit approach by defeating an amendment which would
have presumed undue hardship if a reasonable accommodation cost more than 1 0% of the
employee's annual salary." (citation omitted)); LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & HENRY A. BEYER,
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF ALL � �ERICANS 65 (1993) ("Congress refused to 'peg undue hardship to a fixed
. . . . . . ).
raho
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 ("[T]he definition of
'undue hardship' in the ADA is intended to convey a significant, as opposed to a de minimis
or insignificant, obligation on the part of employers.").
179. H.R. REP. NO. 1 01-485, pt. 3, at 40.
180. See s. REP. No. 101-1 1 6, at 36 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40. The leg
islative history states that the duty to accommodate under the ADA is more significant than
the duty to accommodate for religious discrimination, established in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), which requires only a showing of de minimis cost
increase to absolve the defendant of the duty to accommodate. See also, e.g., Worthington v.
City of New Haven, No. 3:94-CV-00609(EBB), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16104, at *36 (D.
Conn. Oct. 5, 1999); Prewitt v. United States Postal Services, 662 F.2d 292, 308 n.22 (5th Cir.
1981); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 1630.15(d) ("To demonstrate undue hardship pursuant to the
ADA and this part, an employer must show substantially more difficulty or expense than
would be needed to satisfy the 'de minimis' Title V l l standard of undue hardship.")
181. See WILLIAM D. GOREN, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: AN OVERVIEW FOR LA WYERS 24 (2000).
182. In the original version of the ADA, a hardship was considered undue only if the
accommodation "threatened the continued existence of the employer's business." Congress
rejected this approach. Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with
Disabilities A ct, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1448 (1991 ).
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pense. 183 A defendant cannot absolve himself of liability in an ADA
case by simply pleading the undue hardship defense.184 In addition, a
court will not rely on a defendant's unsupported statements that a
hardship is undue.185 Nor will a court find in favor of the defendant by
making presumptions about the difficulty or expense of an accommo
dation.186
The ADA and its regulations offer some guidance as to the type of
evidence that courts should require defendants to provide to demon
strate undue hardship. The statute lists several factors for a court to
consider. These include: (1) the nature and cost of the accommoda
tion; (2) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; and (3)
the type of operation of the covered entity.187 The legislative history
and EEOC regulations indicate that courts may consider three addi
tional factors. These include: (1) the impact of the accommodation on
other employees' abilities to perform their duties and the facility's
ability to conduct business;188 (2) the total number of employees
benefiting from the accommodation;1 89 and (3) the availability of
outside funding to pay for the accommodation.190 The statute and
cases also include the fundamental alteration defense as a component
of the undue hardship defense.191 That is, a court must consider
183. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMODATION, supra
note 1 77, at 54 ("Generalized conclusions will not suffice to support a claim of undue
hardship. I nstead, undue hardship must be based on an individualized assessment of current
circumstances that show a specific reasonable accommodation would cause significant diffi
culty or expense." (citation omitted)).
1 84. See Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 649 (1st Cir. 2000);
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 1 31 , 143 (2d Cir. 1 995); Langon v. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
1 85. See Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., 209 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2000) (denying
summary judgment because the defendant has "offered only general statements regarding
the snowball effect of such an accommodation"); Langon, 959 F.2d at 1 060; 29 C.F.R. pt.
1 630 app. 1630.15(d) ("It should be noted, however, that an employer cannot simply assert
that a needed accommodation will cause it undue hardship . . . and thereupon be relieved of
the duty to provide accommodation.").
186. See Brandfield, supra note 175, at 128 ("The ADA clearly cal!s for basing determi
nations of undue hardship on objective data . . . not on presumptions as to the abilities of a
class of disabled individuals or the hardships they will cause."); Kristen M. Ludgate, Note,
Telecommuting am/ the Americans with Disabilities Act: ls Working at Home a Reasonable
Accommodation?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1309, 1 335 (1 997) ("[T]he final decision under a fact

specific approach will reflect the actual feasibility of telecommuting . . . [as a reasonable ac
commodation], rather than rely on outdated and inaccurate assumptions.").
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 21 1 1 (10)(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2).
1 88. See 29 C.F.R. § 1 630.2(p)(2)(v).
1 89. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 93 (1 989). For instance, if an elevator is installed in an
office building to accommodate an employee confined to a wheelchair, all employees may
benefit from using the elevator.
1 90. See S. REP. No. 101-1 16, at 93.
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whether an accommodation would require a business to change its
mission or alter its essential nature.1 92
Despite Congress and the EEOC's attempts to develop factors for
courts to consider in determining whether a hardship is undue, the
standard remains ambiguous.193 Courts must determine undue
hardship by looking at individualized facts on a case-by-case basis.194
Courts have, however, developed a "relatively consistent framework"
for evaluating undue hardship cases.195 As a general rule, courts rely
on the factors outlined in the statute and regulations to determine
whether an accommodation would present an undue hardship.196 They
consider the costs of the accommodation,197 the nature of the accom
modation,198 the employer's resources,199 and the impact that the ac
commodation would have on the employer's business.200

191. See PGA Tour Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1884 (2001); Sch. Bd. v. Nassau
County, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Burriola
v. Greater Toledo YMCA, 133 F.Supp. 2d 1034, 1038 (N.D. Ohio 2001); H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 3, at 59 (1990); GOREN, supra note 181, at 24; Voss, supra note 153, at 937. Funda
mental alteration is a component of undue hardship under Title I, but is listed as a separate
companion defense to undue burden under Title III. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303. Whether fun
damental alteration is viewed as included within the hardship defense or as a companion de
fense, it still must be considered.
192. See Kearney, supra note 173.
193. See Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an
Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities A ct,

48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 396 (1995); Ludgate, supra note 186, at 1318 ("The requirements for
establishing an undue hardship defense are ambiguous because neither Congress nor the
EEOC have promulgated specific guidelines that distinguish a reasonable accommodation
from an undue hardship.").
194. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 42 ("The determination of undue hardship is a
factual one which must be made on a case-by-case basis."); JAMES G. FRIERSON,
EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 154 (1995).
195. Ludgate, supra note 186, at 1319 ("Despite the lack of specific guidelines, courts
have developed a relatively consistent framework for evaluating reasonable accommodation
cases.").
196. See supra notes 187-192 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Timothy H. v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 178 F.3d 968, 970-71 (8th
Cir. 1999); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1283 (8th Cir. 1985); Burriola v. Greater
Toledo YMCA, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1039 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (holding that a day care center
could provide one-on-one attention to a disabled child without undue hardship because the
additional time required by day care staff was minimal and would not cost very much);
Worthington v. City of New Haven, No. 3:94-CV-00609( EBB), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16104, •36 (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 1999); Garza v. Abbott Laboratories, 940 F. Supp. 1227, 1243
(N.D. Ill. 19%) (denying summary judgment because an issue as to the actual cost of the ac
commodation remained and would bear significantly on whether undue hardship existed.);
Huber v. Howard County, 849 F. Supp. 407, 414 (D. Md. 1994).
198. See Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 581 (3d Cir. 1998); Davis v. Francis
Howell Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a school would suffer undue
hardship if it were to be required to give prescription medication to a child with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder because the school nurse was not capable of determining the
safety of the dosage.); Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a state
would suffer undue hardship if it were required to include non-mentally alert individuals in a
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Courts have also identified and relied on at least four additional
criteria not listed in the statute or regulations. First, courts have con
sidered the past practices of either the defendant or society in deter
mining whether an accommodation would create an undue hardship.201
If the defendant or other similar entity took actions similar to the
requested accommodation in the past, the accommodation would not
be an undue hardship.202 Second, courts consider the externalities of a
requested accommodation on others, particularly other employees.203
Third, courts conduct a cost/benefit analysis to determine whether an
accommodation would create an undue hardship.204 Finally, at least a
few courts have considered the importance of the defendant's business
to a community or society.205 If a defendant's services are beneficial or

state program for mentally alert disabled individuals because the increase in numbers of in
dividuals in the program could not be handled by the state).
199. See Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir.
1998) (arguing that a large company will experience less hardship from costly accommoda
tions.); Worthington v. City of New Haven, No. 3:94-CV-00609(EBB), 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16104, at "'36 (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 1999).
200. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n., 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
an .accommodation was an undue hardship because it threatened the future of the defen
dant's organization); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the de
fendant demonstrated undue hardship by showing that the accommodation would lead to a
loss of "essential operational flexibility"); Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869,
878 (9th Cir. 1989) ("(T]he first two proposed accommodations would have imposed an
undue hardship on ARCO's ability to effectively operate its refinery."); Emery v. Caravan of
Dreams, 879 F. Supp. 640, 642 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
201. See Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1334; Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 654 (3d Cir. 1995);
Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1 016 (3d Cir. 1995).
202. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 666 (2001); Barnett v. United States
Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000); Barth, 2 F.3d at 1188 ("As the VOA admits
that it restricts the assignment of certain of its current radio specialists for medical and fam
ily reasons, there can be no claim that such an accommodation would mark a 'fundamental
alteration' in the nature of the VOA's program."); Service v. Union Pacific R.R., 153 F.
Supp. 2d 1 187, 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the requested accommodation of a
no-smoking policy was not an undue hardship because the company had instituted a
no-smoking policy in the past).
203. See Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., 209 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2000) ("MHRI
could have introduced evidence that in order to accommodate Ward, . . . his duties would
need to be subsumed by a co-worker."); Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002,
1017 (3d Cir. 1995) (arguing that the defendant need not accommodate the plaintiff because
she created a health and safety risk to the staff and patients at Fair Acres); Zarin, supra note
175, at 516 ("Externalities on employees could play a significant part in the undue hardship
determination.").
204. See e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[A]n accommodation is reasonable only if its costs are not clearly disproportionate to the
benefits it will produce.") (citing Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43
(7th Cir. 1995)); Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543; Ransom v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 983 F.
Supp. 895, 903 (D. Az. 1997) (" 'Undue' hardship . . . is a relational term: the costs that the
employer must assume are measured in relation to the benefits of the accommodation, in
cluding societal benefits of reducing dependency and nonproductivity.").
205. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. v. United Blood Servs., No. 99
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7272, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2001); Nelson v. Thornburgh,

C2060, 2001
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necessary to society as a whole, a requested accommodation is more
likely to present an undue hardship to the employer.206
B.

Application of the Undue Hardship Standard to Safe Harbor Cases

Congress intended the safe harbor provision to offer insurers and
self-insured employers a narrow and limited exception to the require
ments of the ADA.207 By viewing the standard broadly and upholding
insurers' decisions to deny coverage simply because they plead the
safe harbor defense, courts ignore the meaning of the safe harbor
provision.208 This sectiQn demonstrates how courts can adhere to
Congress's intent by relying on the undue hardship standard in safe
harbor cases.
In safe harbor cases, the defendant should bear the burden of
proving that a disability-based distinction is justified under the ADA
because the safe harbor is a defense to liability. Currently, in safe har
bor cases, the plaintiff has the initial burden of showing that she is a
disabled individual and that her insurer denied coverage as a result of
her disability.209 Once the plaintiff has met her burden, the court
should presume that the defendant has violated the ADA.210 As in
undue hardship cases, the burden should shift to the defendant, who
may successfully defend its decision to deny coverage by showing that
it is protected by the safe harbor.21 1 The EEOC agrees that the burden
of supporting the safe harbor defense should rest with the defendant
because it is "the party who has the greatest access to the relevant
fa cts."212 Likewise, the insurer or self-insured employer has sole access
to the actuarial or experience-based evidence needed to support its
safe harbor defense, and therefore, should bear the burden of proof.213
567 F. Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("When one considers the social costs which would
flow from the exclusion of persons such as plaintiffs from the pursuit of their profession, the
modest cost of accommodation . . . seems . . . quite small.").
206. See United Blood Servs., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at * 7-8 (finding that an accommo
dation could present an undue hardship for a non-profit corporation that operated blood
centers, at least in part, because of the importance of the defendant's business to society).
207. See supra Part I.
208. See, e.g., Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank, 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999); Rogers v.
Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 432 (4th Cir. 1 998).
209. See Kearney, supra note 173, at 8. The ADA defines a "qualified disabled individ
ual" as any individual who can perform the essential functions of his or her job with or
without a reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1 (2000) .
210. See Kearney, supra note 173, at 8.
211. See EEOC INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 61, at 9-10.
212. Id. at 5.
213. See Estes, supra note 27, at 112 ("Under the ADA, the burden of proving subter
fuge - or lack thereof - should rightfully be on the employer, because the employer has
access to all of the underwriting and classifying information that was used to develop the
health-benefit plan.").
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At least one scholar has argued that the defendant should not bear
the burden of proof of the safe harbor defense214 because Congress did
not include the safe harbor provision among its list of affirmative
defenses to Title 1.215 By placing the safe harbor in a separate section
of the Act - apart from the defenses - Congress indicated that it
intended the safe harbor to be a rule of statutory construction, not an
affirmative defense.21 6 As a rule of statutory construction, the burden
of proof would not fall on the defendant insurer. Even though the safe
harbor appears separately in the statute, several arguments support
the placement of the burden on the insurer. First, Congress may have
elected not to include the safe harbor among its list of affirmative de
fenses in part because it viewed the safe harbor as a unique defense.
. Unlike the undue hardship defense, the safe harbor defense is limited
in its applicability to the insurance industry.217 Its limited applicability
may have led Congress to include the safe harbor in a separate section,
even though Congress intended the provision to be treated as an
affirmative defense. Second, Congress has historically placed safe har
bors in separate sections of statutes, rather than including them in a
list of affirmative defenses.218 Placing the ADA safe harbor separately
suggests Congress's desire to be consistent, not its intent for the safe
harbor to be treated differently than other defenses. Finally, Congress
intended the safe harbor to apply to both Titles I and III of the Act.219
Including the safe harbor only among the defenses to Title I would
either not have indicated Congress's full intent or required Congress
to repeat the same language under Title III.
By adopting the undue hardship defense standard in safe harbor
cases, courts would require defendant insurers to present evidence,
either in the form of actuarial statistics or experience-based data, that
demonstrates that the predicted costs or burden of providing coverage
to a disabled individual are so high as to justify the denial of coverage
to the individual.220 The ADA's legislative history and agency interpre-

214. See Farber, supra note 50, at 851.
215. The undue hardship defense, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000), and direct threat
defense, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2000), were included within the text of Title I, while the safe
harbor provision is in Title V, the statute's miscellaneous provision. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)
(2000).
216. See Farber, supra note 50, at 851.
217. See id.
218. For instance, in fraud and abuse statutes, Congress placed the safe harbors in a
separate section rather than including them near the text of other defenses. See 42 U.S.C. §
1 395nn(b)-(e) (2000).
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000).
220. In the large majority of instances, an insurer will argue that coverage of a disabled
individual presents an undue hardship because it is excessively costly. Theoretically,
however, an insurer could also argue that coverage is an undue hardship because it presents
an administrative burden. See Estes, supra note 27, at 92. In his article, Jeffrey Manning ar-
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tations support this evidentiary requirement.221 In addition, once
courts have applied the undue hardship standard in safe harbor cases,
courts should treat the defendant insurer's burden of providing evi
dence to justify the safe harbor defense as significant. A defendant
should not be protected by the safe harbor simply by showing a de
minimis increase in costs or burden.222 The EEOC guidance supports
this increased standard in safe harbor cases.223 The agency stated that
the defendant must produce evidence that coverage would lead to a
drastic increase in costs and/or premium payments or a drastic altera
tion of the breadth of coverage or benefits.224 In addition, once courts
apply the undue hardship standard, their decisions as to whether the
defendant has met its burden should be based on an assessment of ac
tual evidence. A court should. not base its determination on specula
tion about the increased risk created by a particular disability.225
In safe harbor cases, courts should also look to the undue hardship
standard f or guidance as to the kind of evidence that a defendant in
surer must present to support its safe harbor defense. A court should
consider the increased costs to the insurer that would stem f rom cov
erage, the nature of the coverage decisions, the overall financial
resources of the defendant insurer, and the effect that coverage would
have on the operation of the defendant's business.226 Most imporgues that only actuarial data should be able to justify disability-based distinctions by insur
ers. See John Manning, Are Insurance Companies Liable Under the ADA?, 88 CAL. L. REV.
607, 647-48 (2000) . He contends that experience-based evidence, though discussed in the
legislative history, should not be viewed by courts as a legitimate rationale for denying cov
erage to a disabled individual. See id. ("There is no reason, under my argument, why we
should rely on the language 'based on sound actuarial principles or related to actual or rea
sonably anticipated experience' that appears in the legislative history. The text of the statute
itself supplies the actuarial data requirement, so this secondary source is unnecessary.").
Manning argues that reliance on experience-based evidence undermines the statute's actu
arial data requirement. Id. at 648. Manning's view, however, is contrary to Congress's
expression of intent found in the legislative history. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989).
Congress clearly did not agree that the experienced-based evidence requirement
undermined the actuarial data requirement. It listed the two kinds of evidence in the same
sentence as potential support for a denial of coverage to a disabled individual. See id. By
arguing that it did, Manning rejects the legislative history in favor of a strict reliance on the
statutory language. Such a statutory interpretation would be appropriate only if the legisla
tive history conflicted with the statutory language; it does not in this case. See ABNER J.

MIKVA AND ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND TiiE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 34 (1997).
221.

See supra notes 47-74 and accompanying text.

222.

See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990); s. REP. No. 101-116, at 36.

223.

See EEO C INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 61, at 6.

224. See id. ("The respondent may prove that the challenged insurance practice or ac
tivity is necessary . . . to prevent the occurrence of an unacceptable change either in the cov
erage of the health insurance plan, or in the premiums charged for the health insurance plan.
An 'unacceptable' change is a drastic increase in premium payments . . . or a drastic altera
tion to the scope of coverage or level of benefits provided . . . .").
225. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 71.
226. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(p)(2) (2002).
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tantly, courts should consider the costs of coverage when deciding
whether a disability-based distinction is justified under the ADA.227 In
addition to costs, courts should consider whether coverage would
interfere with the future provision of coverage or would constitute a
fundamental alteration of the defendant insurer's business.228
Even if a court finds that the costs or nature of coverage are
burdensome, pursuant to the undue hardship model, it should weigh
those factors against a number of other factors before determining
whether a defendant's disability-based distinction is justified under the
safe harbor provision. First, courts should consider the past coverage
practices of the insurer.229 For instance, if the defendant has provided
coverage to other individuals who presented similar risks to the plain
tiff, a court should not find that the decision to deny coverage was jus
tified. The EEOC stated its support for a consideration of the defen
dant's past coverage decisions when deciding safe harbor cases.230
Second, courts should consider the effect that a coverage decision will
have on other policyholders.231 Most likely, coverage will affect other
policyholders in the form of increased premium payments. If such
increases are excessive, an insurer's decision to deny coverage may be
justified. Third, courts should weigh the costs of a coverage decision
against the benefits to both the disabled individual, as well as society

227. See GOSTIN & BEYER, supra note 177, at 65 ("[C]ost is the most important,
although certainly not the only, factor in assessing undue hardship.").
228. See, e.g., Arline v. Nassau County, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). Defendants will likely
contend that if the ADA compels an insurer to provide coverage to a disabled individual,
then the statute interferes with underwriting practices, an essential element of the insurance
industry, and therefore, constitutes a fundamental alteration. This argument does not justify
disability-based distinctions. First, the restrictions on underwriting as a result of the ADA
are limited. Insurers will be able to continue traditional underwriting practices for all indi
viduals who are not disabled. Second, the Supreme Court's decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin limited the reach of the fundamental alteration defense. See Martin, 532 U.S. 661
(2001). The PGA Tour argued that permitting a competitor to ride in a cart rather than walk
in a professional golf tournament would fundamentally alter the game of golf. See id. at 67071. The Tour essentially claimed that it was responsible for determining the fundamental
elements of its own business and the court should defer to its determination. See id. at 671.
The Court disagreed. The case supports the proposition that a defendant should not be per
mitted to define what is fundamental to its own business or industry. See id. at 689-90. After
Martin, therefore, it is for courts, not the insurance industry, to decide whether the industry's
underwriting practices are fundamental.
229. Several courts have identified the importance of the defendant's past practices in
undue hardship cases. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
230. See EEOC INTERIM G UIDANCE, supra note 61, at 11 {"The respondent may prove
that the disparate treatment is justified by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasona
bly anticipated experience, and that conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or expe
rience are treated in the same fashion."(citation omitted)).
231. Courts have considered the externalities of a reasonable accommodation when de
termining undue hardship. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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in general.232 A consideration of the interests of society in this calculus
comports with the broad purposes of the ADA.233
A case example will provide a further illustration of how a court
should apply the undue hardship standard in a safe harbor case. In
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. ,234 the plaintiffs brought suit
against their health insurers because they were subjected to lower
lifetime benefit limits because they suffered from AIDS than were in
dividuals with other disabilities or illnesses.235 The defendant insurer
pleaded the safe harbor defense but did not provide . any evidence in
support.236 Despite the lack of evidence, the Seventh Circuit held that
the safe harbor justified the disability-based distinction.237 Applying
the undue hardship standard in this case should lead to a different
analysis by the court and potentially a different outcome. The defen
dant's failure to provide any evidence explaining the lower cap should
result in a decision for the plaintiff because· the defendant insurer
bears the burden of proof to justify the lower AIDS benefit cap.238
Had the defendant presented actuarial or experienced-based evidence
justifying the AIDS cap, the court should have evaluated the evidence
to assess whether the insurer met its burden and whether the safe har
bor permitted the lower cap. In order to meet its burden, the defen
dant would most likely present evidence of the high costs of AIDS
care. This evidence might include actuarial tables or data of the in
surer's own experiences paying for the care of individuals with AIDS.
In addition, the defendant may present evidence of how uncapped
coverage of an individual with AIDS would affect the insurer's ability
to provide sufficient care to others. The court's role should · be to
assess this evidence to determine if the defendant met its burden of
proof.239 It should weigh the likelihood and magnitude of increased
costs that would result from coverage as well as the administrative and
financial burden on the insurer and other policyholders against the
benefits to both the disabled individual and/or society. This calculus
would help the court determine whether the cap was discriminatory or
justified under the safe harbor.

232. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
233. 42 u.s.c. § 1210l(b) (1994).
234. 179 F.3d 557 (1999).
235. The health insurance policies limited AIDS coverage to $25,000 and $100,000. Coverage for all other conditions was limited to $1 million. Id. at 558.
236. See Doe, 179 F.3d at 561.
237. See id. at 564.
238. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
239. The court might also want to consider other evidence such as the insurer's coverage
limits for other disabilities or illnesses or the societal benefits that may flow from uncapped
coverage for individuals with AIDS. See supra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
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There are several positive implications that will result from courts'
adoption of the undue hardship standard in safe harbor defense cases.
First, courts' reliance on a stricter standard will most likely lead to
greater insurance coverage for the disabled.240 Such a result promises
to solve, if only in part, the important and growing problem of the
large number of uninsured and underinsured Americans.241 Second,
the new standard will ensure that courts provide a rationale for deci
sions in favor of a defendant insurer. As a result, courts' decisions will
tend to be more equitable. This result is especially important consid
ering that courts may find against individual plaintiffs because of a
general belief that ADA claims are largely illegitimate.242 Finally, the
adoption of the undue hardship standard may have an ex ante effect
on the actions of insurers. Insurers may be more likely to make
actuarial determinations before denying coverage to a disabled indi
vidual because of their concern about later liability. In addition; they
may have a greater incentive to settle cases with disabled plaintiffs
when the actuarial evidence in the insurer's favor is vague or ques
tionable. The positive results from this ex ante effect would be two
fold: first, insurers will tend to base coverage decisions on actual data,
rather than discrimination against the disabled; and second, courts will
be faced with a reduced ADA caseload.
C.

Justifications for the Adoption ofthe Undue Hardship Standard

There are two main features of the undue hardship standard that
make it an appropriate model for courts to use in assessing safe harbor
defense claims. First, cases decided under the standard are not
predetermined. By pleading the undue hardship defense, defendants
are not guaranteed exemption from the . reasonable accommodation
requirement. Courts often find in favor of plaintiffs even when the de
fendant claims that an accommodation would present an undue hard
ship.243 By limiting the reach of the safe harbor provision, Congress
similarly intended that defendants not be guaranteed exemption from
240. See John Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 311, 365
(1997) (arguing that broadening the reach of the ADA will lead to increased coverage for
disabled individuals).
.

241. The proportion of Americans without insurance increased from 14.2% in 1995 to
16.1 % in 1997. Robert Kuttner, The American Health Care System: Health Insurance
Coverage, NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 14, 1999, at 163. There are currently almost 44 million
Americans who do not have any health insurance and a substantial proportion of those are
children. Id.
242. See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 768 (W.D. Mich.
2001) ("Defendant's arguments concerning the effect of past accommodations, lack of sub
stitute personnel, and the need for predictable attendance all relate to the question of undue
burden, upon which defendant bears the burden of persuasion. The evidence on the issue of
undue burden is not so one-sided that Wal-Mart must prevail as a matter of law.").
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Titles I and III simply by pleading the safe harbor defense. Courts
have interpreted safe harbor cases as if they had a predetermined
outcome.244 In nearly all cases, a defendant who pleads the safe harbor
defense will win on summary judgment or at trial.245 Reliance on the
undue hardship model in safe harbor cases will ensure that courts no
longer treat safe harbor cases as predetermined.
Second, a defendant must present evidence of an undue hardship
to justify exemption from the reasonable accommodation require
ment.246 Merely pleading the undue hardship defense without
presenting sufficient evidence results in a decision in favor of the
plaintiff, presuming the plaintiff has established its prima facie case.247
Congress similarly intended that defendants present actual evidence of
actuarial data or experience to justify the safe harbor defense.248
Courts have failed to require defendants to present such evidence in
safe harbor cases.249 The undue hardship model will ensure consistency
with congressional intent in safe harbor cases by requiring defendants
to present actual evidence of an undue hardship. It is, therefore, an
appropriate standard to use in safe harbor cases.
There are several secondary justifications for the adoption of the
undue hardship model. The application of the undue hardship stan
dard is consistent with the underlying goals of the ADA. The statute
was designed to ensure broad and comprehensive protection for
disabled Americans.250 Such broad protection calls for a standard that
reduces the burden on plaintiffs of proving discrimination and requires
defendant employers and insurers to meet a significant burden to jus
tify disability-based distinctions. The undue hardship standard is
appropriate because it places a significant burden on defendants to
justify denying a reasonable accommodation.251
244. See supra Part Il(A ).
245. See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 1999).
246. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMODATION, supra
note 177, at 54 ("Generalized conclusions will not suffice to support a claim of undue hard
ship. Instead, undue hardship must be based on an individualized assessment of current cir
cumstances that show a specific reasonable accommodation would cause significant difficulty
or expense." (citation omitted)).
247. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 143 (2d Cir. 1995) ("But in
the absence of evidence regarding school district budgets, the cost of providing an aide of
this sort, or any like kind of information, we are unable to conclude that unreasonableness
or undue hardship has been established . . . ."); see also Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals,
Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 649 (1st Cir. 2000); Langon v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 959
F.2d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
248. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70-71 (1990); s. REP. NO. 101-116, at 84-85
(1989).
249. See, e.g., Leonard F. v. lsrael Disc. Bank., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 3, at 23.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(1994); H.R. REP. N0. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40.
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In addition, rules of statutory interpretation state that when part of
a statute is unclear or ambiguous, courts should look to other parts of
the statute for interpretive clues.252 It is appropriate to look to the rea
sonable accommodation/undue hardship framework in Titles I, II, and
III to better understand Congress' intent because the safe harbor
provision is ambiguous. Finally, employers and judges are already fa
miliar with the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship stan
dards. The standards were developed under the Rehabilitation Act in
the late 1970s and have remained largely unchanged today.253 The
reliance on an already existing and well-understood standard will not
only ease implementation for judges, insurers, and employers, but will
assure consistent and more effective application.254
D.

Objections to the Adoption of the Undue Hardship Standard

Opponents may raise a number of objections to the application of
the undue hardship standard in safe harbor defense cases.255 First, op
ponents may contend that the proposed adoption of the undue hard
ship standard reads the safe harbor out of the statute.256 Insurers and
employers are required to make reasonable accommodations and are
permitted to rely on the undue hardship defense under Titles I and
III.257 This Note argues that they should also be bound by the same
standard under the safe harbor provision. Some may argue that mod
eling the safe harbor defense after the undue hardship standard leads
to the inconsistent and inappropriate conclusion that Congress did not
intend the safe harbor to have any additional meaning, beyond that
already incorporated into the statute by Titles I and III, because the
undue hardship standard would apply to insurers and employers re
gardless of the safe harbor provision.258 This Note does not, however,
treat the safe harbor provision as superfluous; the provision still plays
an important role in the statute by eliminating confusion for insurers
252. See ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 264-66.
253. For the origins of the undue hardship defense, see Southeastern Cmty. College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979).

254. See Peter D. Jacobson & Michael T. Cahill, Applying Fiduciary Responsibilities in
the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 171 (2000) ("Jn terms of the relative

ease of its implementation, a 'new' alternative that is still rooted in traditional common law
concepts and doctrines may be easier to implement than a truly radical or revolutionary ap
proach.").
255. See supra Part IJ(b) (discussing courts' reasons for broadly interpreting the safe
harbor provision.).
256. Interview with Thomas Bulleit, Partner, Hogan and Hartson L.L.P., in Washington,
D.C. (Fall 2001).
257. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12182
(1994).
258. See ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 10, at 266-68.
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and courts as to whether insurers and self-insured employers are
bound by the ADA.259
Second, proponents of a market-based approach to insurance cov
erage may argue that forced risk pooling will create an unstable mar
ket for insurance.260 They may contend that the application of the
undue hardship def ense in safe harbor cases forces greater risk pool
ing261 and cross-subsidization262 into the insurance market.263 By placing
the burden of supporting the safe harbor defense on defendants,
courts will more often find in favor of plaintiffs in ADA safe harbor
cases. Insurers, therefore, will be required to provide coverage to a
higher number of disabled individuals resulting in greater risk pool
ing.264 Low risk individuals will "opt out" of the market because they
do not want to pay high premiums necessary to subsidize high-risk in
dividuals, resulting in a new population of uninsured individuals.
Unable to cross-subsidize claims from high risk individuals with
premiums from low risk individuals, insurers will be forced to raise
premiums to exorbitant levels.265
Despite the risk of introducing instability into the insurance mar
ket, there are a number of arguments that continue to support a pro
posal that would create greater insurance coverage for the disabled.
The fear of market instability generally arises when some insurers can
undercut their competitors by offering lower premiums to low risk in
dividuals.266 This competition causes segmentation in the market such
that the low risks no longer subsidize the care of the high risks. The
concern over market segmentation will not arise if the ADA forces in
surers to cover disabled individuals because the ADA applies equally
to all insurers; one insurer will not be able to undercut its competitor's
premiums because all are bound by the ADA. Opponents' potential
259. The safe harbor provision specifically states that it applies to "insurance." See 42
U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
260. Interview with Peter Hammer, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Spring 2001).
261. Risk pooling occurs when individuals with varied risk levels are grouped together
into one insurance pool.
262. Cross-subsidization follows from risk pooling and occurs when healthy
policyholders are forced to cover the costs of care of ill policyholders through high
premiums.
263. Interview with Peter Hammer, supra note 260. Such a proposal is analogous to
attempts to develop an insurance system based on community rating. That is, all individuals,
regardless of risk, would be charged the same premium. Under an experience rated system,
individuals are charged varied premiums based on their assessed risk.
264. See Jacobi, supra note 240, at 347 ("Ultimately, the ADA forces employment-based
coverage toward risk-pooling, and away from risk segmentation.").
265. Interview with Richard Hirth, Associate Professor, University of Michigan School
of Public Health, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Fall 2001).
266. Insurers' attempts to identify and attract low risks with low premiums is known as
"cherry picking." See Jacobi, supra note 240, at 319.
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objections based on a market-based approach, however, remain an
open question; a more detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this
Note.
Third, opponents may object to the proposed adoption of the
undue hardship standard in safe harbor cases because its adoption will
not dramatically affect the protection of disabled individuals. In her
first study of the outcomes of ADA cases, Ruth Colker found that
disabled plaintiffs lose in more than ninety-three percent of ADA
employment cases.267 She reported similar results in a second study.268
Although plaintiffs are more often successful in undue hardship cases
than in safe harbor cases, they still face significant difficulties in win
ning ADA claims.269 As a result, the application of the undue hardship
standard to safe harbor cases would not necessarily ensure increased
protection for the disabled. Courts' current failures to adequately
protect disabled individuals do not, however, justify continued reli
ance on standards that perpetuate discriminatory practices. In fa ct, the
lack of adherence to the intent of the ADA increases the need for re
vised standards.
CONCLUSION
When the ADA was first enacted it offered the promise of finally
protecting disabled Americans from discrimination by employers,
public services, and public accommodation. The statute has, however,
failed to meet the expectations of those who heralded its passage in
1990.270 Despite some gains and successes, disabled individuals
continue to have higher unemployment and poverty rates than any
other group of Americans.271 The lack of protection afforded to the
disabled stems in large part from courts' narrow constructions of the
statute. Particularly in the last several years, courts have misinter
preted the statute, contributing to its ineffectiveness and undermining
its goals.272 The result of courts' misinterpretations is the exclusion of
many victims of real disability discrimination from the protections of

267. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 12, at 100.
268. See Colker, Winning, supra note 163, at 247-51.
269. See EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
ISSUES IN LA w, PUBLIC POLICY' AND RESEARCH 7 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) ("[C]ourts
are often construing the ADA far too narrowly and excluding from its protection many vic
tims of real disability discrimination.").
270. See Devroy, supra note 7; cf. Colker, Windfall, supra note 12, at 100.
271. See EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
supra note 269, at 4.
272. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001 ); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527
U.S. 471 (1999).

December 2002)

Safe, but Not Sound

883

the statute.273 This Note discussed courts' broad interpretations of the
safe harbor provision that nearly immunize insurers and self-insured
employers from ADA liability. As a solution, this Note proposed that
courts adopt the undue hardship standard in safe harbor defense cases.
The adoption of this standard promises to ensure a more limited and
narrow interpretation of the safe harbor, as well as more equitable
treatment of people with disabilities.

273. See EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
supra note 269, at 7.

